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This Article argues that police disciplinary appeals serve as an underappreciated 
barrier to officer accountability and organizational reform. Scholars and experts 
generally agree that rigorous enforcement of internal regulations within a police 
department promotes constitutional policing by deterring future misconduct and 
removing unfit officers from the streets. In recent years, though, a troubling pattern 
has emerged. Because of internal appeals procedures, police departments must often 
rehire or significantly reduce disciplinary sanctions against officers who have engaged 
in serious misconduct. Little legal research has comprehensively examined the appeals 
process available to officers facing disciplinary sanctions. 
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By drawing on a national dataset of police union contracts, this Article analyzes 
the disciplinary appeals process utilized in a substantial cross section of large and 
midsized American police departments. It shows that the majority of these 
departments give police officers the ability to appeal disciplinary sanctions through 
multiple levels of appellate review. At the end of this process, many departments 
allow officers to appeal disciplinary sanctions to an arbitrator selected, in part, by 
the local police union or the aggrieved officer. Most jurisdictions give these 
arbitrators expansive authority to reconsider factual and legal decisions related to 
the disciplinary matter. And police departments frequently ban members of the 
public from watching or participating in these appellate hearings. While each of these 
appellate procedures may be individually defensible, they may theoretically combine 
in many police departments to create a formidable barrier to officer accountability. 
This Article concludes by considering the implications of these findings for the 
literature on police reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August of 2015, an officer with the San Antonio Police Department 
(SAPD) reported to the scene of an apparent shooting in the city’s South 
Side neighborhood.1 While collecting evidence, the officer encountered 
forty-eight–year-old neighborhood resident Elroy Leal, who pointed out 
several bullet casings that the officer had missed during his inspection of 
the crime scene.2 The situation quickly escalated,3 and moments later, the 
officer placed Mr. Leal under arrest.4 
At this point, a dash camera captured video and audio of a disturbing series 
of events, as Mr. Leal sat handcuffed in the back of the officer’s squad car.5 
Throughout the seventeen minutes of video released by the SAPD, the officer 
appeared to verbally berate Mr. Leal,6 describing him as a “trashy human 
being,”7 mocking his intelligence,8 and labeling him as “disrespectful.”9 When 
 
1 Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers Fired for 
Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired [https://perma.cc/S4YE-4Y4Y] (describing the San Antonio 
incident, along with a number of other similar incidents where police officers were eventually 
rehired through the appeals process after termination); Mark D. Wilson, Video: SAPD Officer 
Suspended After Challenging Arrestee to Fight, Removing Handcuffs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/crime/article/VIDEO-SAPD-officer-agreed-to-fight-
man-during-7973241.php [https://perma.cc/ZD7D-LKEM] (last updated June 10, 2016) (stating 
that the event took place in the South Side neighborhood of San Antonio, at 5 a.m. in the 3100 
block of Cahmita Street). 
2 According to Mr. Leal, this officer became upset after he said: “Hey cop, can I walk through 
here? Hey, some investigation you guys did.” Michael Barajas, San Antonio Cop Arrests, Berates and 
Threatens to Fight Man for Being “Disrespectful,” SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (June 9, 2016, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2016/06/09/san-antonio-cop-arrests-berates-and-
threatens-to-fight-man-for-being-disrespectful [https://perma.cc/P94A-NFK8]. 
3 The facts on how the situation escalated remain somewhat unclear. But the statements made by 
the officer (and recorded by the dash camera video after the arrest) give us some idea. At one point the 
officer told Mr. Leal, “Who doesn’t make mistakes? Everyone makes mistakes at their job . . . . You did 
not call me officer. You have never called me officer until I said listen, shut the fuck up and get in the 
car . . . . The way you addressed me was incredibly disrespectful . . . . I would never talk to anybody 
like that. That’s why you’re going to jail and I’m not. And you had the chance to run, to fight, whatever, 
but you didn’t. Because not only are you stupid, you’re a coward.” Id. 
4 E.g. Tim Gerber, City Releases Video of SAPD Officer Agreeing to Fight Suspect, Removing 
His Handcuffs, ABC KSAT 12 NEWS (June 7, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://www.ksat.com/news/
defenders/city-releases-video-of-sapd-officer-agreeing-to-fight-suspect-removing-his-handcuffs 
[https://perma.cc/TQ8E-VUHP] (“[The officer] had arrested Leal last August for interfering with the 
duties of a public servant at the scene of a shooting.”). 
5 See id. (providing a link to a YouTube video of the dash camera footage). 
6 In addition to the comments discussed elsewhere in this summary, supra note 3, the officer 
also called Mr. Leal a “sorry human being.” Barajas, supra note 2. 
7 Barajas, supra note 2. 
8 When Mr. Leal said he would like to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, the officer 
responded that, “You wouldn’t even know what the Fifth Amendment is . . . . You don’t know 
anything about history. I doubt you even have a high school diploma.” Id. 
9 Id. 
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Mr. Leal asked why he was under arrest, the officer replied that he would 
“think of something.”10 But perhaps most disturbing of all, as Mr. Leal sat 
handcuffed in the back of the squad car, the officer challenged Mr. Leal to a 
fistfight for the chance to be released.11 
The dash camera video understandably shocked police supervisors and 
officials in the district attorney’s office.12 Soon thereafter, the SAPD moved 
to fire the officer involved in Mr. Leal’s unlawful arrest.13 But before the 
SAPD could finalize the firing, Texas law and the San Antonio police union 
contract provide officers with the right to appeal disciplinary decisions to a 
“qualified, neutral arbitrator.14 Arbitrators, selected in part by the officer 
under investigation,15 have the power to review the factual and legal 
justification for disciplinary actions taken against an officer.16 And a 
decision handed down by such an arbitrator is binding, effectively 
 
10 Wilson, supra note 1 (quoting the officer from the video evidence as responding to Mr. Leal’s 
question by saying, “I’ll think of something. How about public intoxication, pedestrian in a roadway? 
Whatever else I can think of.”). 
11 The officer actually went to the back of the squad car and took off Mr. Leal’s handcuffs, 
seemingly in hopes of engaging in a fistfight. The officer promised that he would “beat [Mr. Leal’s] 
ass.” Kelly et al., supra note 1. 
12 See id. (describing how in December of 2015, Bexar County prosecutors uncovered the video 
as they were reviewing the details of the arrest, and also describing how San Antonio eventually 
made the video public after facing community pressure). 
13 Officer to be Fired for Challenging Man to Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 11, 2016, 10:23 AM), 
https://www.abqjournal.com/790351/officer-to-be-fired-for-challenging-arrested-man-to-fight.html 
[https://perma.cc/YM74-P8RX] (noting that the SAPD gave Officer Belver an indefinite 
suspension for violating departmental policies). Section 143.052 of the Texas Local Government 
Code, which governs disciplinary suspensions in communities like San Antonio, describes an 
“indefinite suspension” as “equivalent to dismissal from the department.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 143.052(b) (2017). 
14 TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(d) (2017). Texas Local Government Code 
Section 143.053 deals with appeals of disciplinary suspensions for communities with a population 
under 1.5 million, providing officers with the ability to appeal suspensions to the civil service 
commission. But under Texas Local Government Code Section 143.057, police officers have the 
option to waive the right to appeal to the civil service commission, and instead appeal to an 
“independent third party hearing examiner” defined as a “qualified neutral arbitrator.” See 
also Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of San Antonio and the San Antonio Police 
Officers’ Association, at 73-80 (Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter San Antonio Collective Bargaining 
Agreement] (on file with author). 
15 TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(d) (2017) (noting that the officer and the 
police supervisor may each alternately strike names of potential arbitrators from a panel of 
seven arbitrators provided by the American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service). San Antonio Collective Bargaining agreement, supra note 14, at 75. 
16 Section 143.057(d) appears to provide no explicit limitation on the arbitrator’s authority to 
re-evaluate the factual and legal grounding for a supervisor’s disciplinary decision. The union 
contract requires the SAPD to prove its case on appeal by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 76. 
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overruling any decisions made by a police chief, mayor, city council, or 
civilian review board.17 
This particular officer was no stranger to the disciplinary appeals process. 
Six years earlier, he stood accused of number of serious incidents of 
misconduct, including a suspiciously similar allegation that he challenged a 
different man to a fistfight after a drunk driving arrest.18 In that case, the 
SAPD also attempted to fire the officer, only to have an arbitrator on appeal 
reduce his termination to a mere thirty-day suspension.19 
But this time seemed different. The entire exchange between Mr. Leal 
and the officer was caught on video, leaving no doubt about the facts in this 
case. And since this was the second time that this officer had apparently 
challenged a suspect in custody to a fight, it raised even more serious concerns 
about his temperament and judgment. However, an arbitrator again ordered 
the SAPD to rehire the officer.20 
Stories like this should worry police reform advocates. Scholars and 
experts generally agree that to promote the protection of constitutional 
rights, police supervisors must consistently investigate and respond to 
officer misconduct. Theoretically, rigorous enforcement of departmental 
regulations deters future misconduct and removes unfit officers from the 
streets.21 But in recent years, various media outlets have observed a troubling 
 
17 TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(c) (2017) (“The hearing examiner’s decision is 
final and binding on all parties. If the . . . police officer decides to appeal to an independent third 
party hearing examiner, the person automatically waives all rights to appeal to a district court . . . .”). 
18 The victim in the earlier case claimed that this officer promised to let him go if he could 
“kick his [a—].” Kelly et al., supra note 1. Additionally, “[b]y the time Flores reached the police 
detention center, he had a bruised left eye, injuries to his back and neck, and a large bruise across 
his face . . . .” Id. In addition, the SAPD found that the officer assaulted a different man after 
entering the man’s home without a warrant. Id. 
19 Id. After the department was forced to rehire the officer, it made him sign a “last chance 
agreement” that premised his future employment on no future misconduct and limited his ability 
to patrol the streets alone. Id. 
20 More specifically, the arbitrator found that, under the terms of the San Antonio police union 
contract, supervisors could not consider his past misconduct in their decision to terminate him, since 
it had taken place over 180 days earlier. Id. This, according to the police union and the arbitrator, 
made the “last chance agreement” effectively null and void. Id. As a result, the arbitrator concluded 
that the city could only consider the immediate circumstances of the behavior in question, making 
termination an unreasonably harsh punishment. Id.; see also Tim Gerber, SAPD Officer Appeals 
Termination, Wins Job Back Through Arbitration, ABC KSAT 12 NEWS (April 27, 2017, 9:47 PM), 
https://www.ksat.com/news/defenders/sapd-officer-appeals-termination-wins-job-back-through-arbitration 
[https://perma.cc/D2HY-KVBH] (elaborating on the rehiring and providing a link to the decision 
handed down by the arbitrator). 
21 As Judge Thelton Henderson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California observed, “[j]ust like any failure to impose appropriate discipline by the [police] chief or 
city administrator, any reversal of appropriate discipline [during the appeals process] undermines 
the very objectives of [the reform program].” Matthew Artz, Judge Orders Investigation into 
Oakland’s Police Arbitration Losses, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:38 PM), 
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pattern. Because of internal appeals procedures, police departments must 
often rehire or significantly reduce disciplinary sanctions against officers 
that have committed egregious acts of misconduct.22 The story from San 
Antonio is hardly unique. 
The media has documented similar stories in police departments across 
the country. For example, in 2007 an Oakland police officer shot and killed an 
unarmed twenty-year-old man.23 Only a few months later, the same officer 
“killed another unarmed man, shooting him three times in the back as he ran 
away.”24 Oakland paid a $650,000 settlement to the family of the deceased 
man and fired the officer.25 But during the disciplinary appeals process, an 
arbitrator ordered Oakland to reinstate the officer and awarded him back 
pay.26 Similarly, an arbitrator overruled a decision by the police department 
in Sarasota, Florida to fire an officer who misled investigators after being 
caught on camera repeatedly and excessively beating a suspect without 
justification.27 And in Washington, D.C., police officials fired an officer after 
his criminal conviction for sexually abusing a teenager in his squad car, only 
to have an arbitrator order him rehired on appeal.28 
In each of these cases and hundreds of others like them across the 
country,29 police disciplinary appeals have forced communities to rehire 
 
http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/08/14/judge-orders-investigation-into-oaklands-police-arbitration-losses 
[https://perma.cc/UHB8-UHG2]. These comments came after reports emerged that the police 
union was successful in reducing or overturning punishment against officers in twelve of the 
previous fifteen cases. 
22 See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 1 (showing that in a survey of large American police 
departments, approximately twenty-three percent of officers won their jobs back through appeals 
after being terminated for misconduct). 
23 Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Streets, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-
keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258 [https://perma.cc/TJG9-J3YS]. 
24 Id. (emphasis added); see also Sean Maher, Early Report Shows Oakland Police Shot Man 
in Back, E. BAY TIMES (July 28, 2008, 4:56 PM), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2008/07/28/
early-report-shows-oakland-police-shot-man-in-back [https://perma.cc/S48S-PEQP]. 
25 Henry K. Lee, Fatal Shooting to Cost Oakland $650,000, S.F. GATE (July 8, 2009, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Fatal-police-shooting-to-cost-Oakland-650-000-3224969.php 
[https://perma.cc/8AU7-72CN]. 
26 Henry K. Lee, Oakland Must Rehire Cop Who Shot Suspect in Back, S.F. GATE (March 5, 2011, 4:00 
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Oakland-must-rehire-cop-who-shot-suspect-in-back-2528215.php 
[https://perma.cc/L9UK-S3WQ]; Sean Maher, Oakland Police Officer to Be Reinstated, MERCURY NEWS 
(Mar. 6, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/03/06/oakland-police-officer-to-be-reinstated 
[https://perma.cc/8SGB-CGH5]. 
27 See Friedersdorf, supra note 23 (describing the incidence and additionally noting that after 
the incident, the officer told investigators that he “should have killed him”). 
28 See Kelly et al., supra note 1 (discussing the firing, the subsequent order to rehire, and the 
efforts by the city to keep the officer, Michael Blaise Sugg-Edwards, out of the department). 
29 For example, in Portland, Oregon, an arbitrator ordered the rehiring of a police officer who 
had allegedly unjustifiably killed an unarmed twenty-five-year-old. See Everton Bailey Jr., Portland 
Must Rehire Cop Fired After Killing Unarmed Man in 2010, Court Rules, OREGONIAN (Dec. 31, 2015), 
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police officers deemed unfit for duty by their supervisors. But to date, there 
have been few comprehensive academic studies analyzing the disciplinary 
appeals procedures that contribute to these problematic outcomes. 
This is in part because police disciplinary appeals vary from one 
jurisdiction to another.30 These procedures are often articulated not just in 
state statutes or municipal codes, but also in department-specific police union 
contracts. Given that there are thousands of decentralized police departments 
in the United States,31 each with their own municipal codes, internal policies, 
and union contracts,32 the content of police disciplinary appeals procedures 
has largely escaped scholarly inquiry. 
To begin filling this gap in the literature, this Article analyzes disciplinary 
appeals procedures across a large number of American police departments. It 
draws on a dataset of 656 police union contracts collected via open record 
requests, searches of municipal websites, state repositories, and the web.33 
This dataset provides a detailed account of the disciplinary appeals process 
available to a large number of American police officers working at the state and 
local level.34 The vast majority of these police departments give officers the 
ability to appeal disciplinary sanctions through multiple levels of appellate 
review.35 At the end of this complex process, the majority of departments permit 
officers to appeal disciplinary sanctions to an arbitrator selected in part by the 
 
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2015/12/portland_must_rehire_cop_fired.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XV4-SQZM] (explaining that the Oregon Court of Appeals ultimately 
reaffirmed an arbitrator and state board’s order to reinstate the officer). And in New London, 
Connecticut, an arbitrator ordered the rehiring of a police officer who shot and paralyzed an 
unarmed man. Connecticut Town Rehires Officer Who Shot Unarmed Man, NEW HAVEN REG., (Mar. 
18, 2014, 8:16 AM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Connecticut-town-rehires-
officer-who-shot-unarmed-11367888.php [https://perma.cc/Z3SL-BVRD]. In 2008, the Pittsburgh 
Bureau of Police fired an officer for “accidentally shooting a 20-year-old man he was trying to pistol 
whip” at the officer’s wife’s birthday party, only to have an arbitrator order the bureau to rehire him. 
Friedersdorf, supra note 23. 
30 See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1258-66 (2017) (showing that some 
police departments’ collective bargaining agreements “provide[] for arbitration” and others do not). 
31 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/22VR-UCZ9] (estimating that there are around 17,985 police and law enforcement 
agencies in the United States). 
32 The majority of police officers are part of labor unions that collectively negotiate their own 
contracts with their local police department. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL 
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (rev. ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F8G6-ULEG] (noting that about two-thirds of police officers are part of 
departments that authorize collective bargaining). 
33 See infra Part III (describing in more detail the methodology for this project). This dataset 
builds on the work of prior researchers. 
34 See infra Part III. 
35 See infra Section IV.A (finding that approximately seventy-three percent of police 
departments studied used some form of outside arbitrators in the disciplinary appeals process). 
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local police union.36 And in virtually all of these cases, police departments give 
arbitrators significant authority to re-litigate the factual and legal grounds for 
disciplinary action.37 While each of these appellate procedures may be 
individually defensible, they could theoretically combine in a large number of 
police departments to create a formidable barrier to accountability. 
This hypothesis has several important implications for the literature on 
police accountability. First, these findings demonstrate that, in most 
American police departments, police supervisors, city councils, mayors, 
and civilian review boards are often not the true adjudicators of internal 
discipline. The final authority on disciplinary actions frequently rests with 
outside arbitrators or third parties.38 This suggests that the average 
American police officer faces even less democratic accountability than 
many scholars have previously assumed. 
Second, the complexity and formidability of the disciplinary appeals 
process may explain the inability of traditional external legal mechanisms to 
promote reform in American police departments.39 In many documented 
cases, supervisors have been forced to rehire officers that have engaged in 
criminal offenses, violence, and other behaviors that raise serious questions 
about their fitness to serve in any law enforcement capacity.40 Sometimes, the 
offenses committed by rehired officers raise serious enough concerns about 
an officer’s proclivity towards dishonesty that prosecutors are required to 
place the officer on a Brady list41 and reassign them so as to avoid impairing 
future criminal prosecutions. This suggests that supervisors may be limited 
in their ability to bring about important personnel changes that could remedy 
patterns of misconduct within a police department. 
 
36 See infra Section IV.B (finding that fifty-four percent of police departments studied allow 
unions significant authority in choosing the arbitrators who will hear disciplinary appeals). 
37 See infra Section IV.C (finding that around seventy percent of departments studied gave 
arbitrators authority to conduct “expansive” or “de novo” review of disciplinary determinations). 
38 See, e.g., Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee 
Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1039-43, 1047-48, 1052 (2016) (providing an excellent and 
detailed summary of civilian review models across a large number of American cities, but 
spending somewhat less time considering how disciplinary appeals may make civilian review 
more symbolic than substantive). 
39 See infra Section IV.E (describing the implications of these findings for the effectiveness of 
the exclusionary rule, civil litigation, criminal prosecution, civilian review boards, and structural 
reform litigation as regulatory mechanisms). 
40 See generally Friedersdorf, supra note 23 (providing numerous, detailed examples of 
officers who were removed from police forces following internal investigations or criminal 
prosecutions and subsequently reinstated following arbitration); Kelly et al., supra note 1 
(providing even more examples of the same). 
41 See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and 
the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 749-51, 762-79 (2015) (describing the 
requirements imparted by Brady and how they interact with records of officer misconduct). 
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Based on these findings, this Article offers some preliminary thoughts on 
how communities could reform the police disciplinary appeal process. For 
one thing, states and localities could increase democratic accountability in 
police disciplinary appeals. To be clear, police officers deserve procedural 
protections to avoid arbitrary punishment. However, in many police 
departments across the country, disciplinary procedures seem as if they are 
designed to insulate officers from democratic oversight. Thus, to the extent 
that communities want to promote democratic oversight of police behavior, 
policymakers could replace arbitrators with democratically accountable 
actors.42 A number of police departments already do this, by providing 
officers with an opportunity to appeal discipline levied by a police supervisor 
to civilian review boards, city councils, mayors, or city managers.43 
Nevertheless, many police officers and union leaders may understandably 
argue that appellate procedures are designed to provide a check on the 
discretionary authority of democratic actors.44 A city council member, mayor, 
civilian review board, or city manager may not be sufficiently detached from 
police department supervisors so as to make an impartial decision on an 
internal disciplinary matter. By contrast, police unions may argue that 
arbitrators are truly neutral and disinterested parties, and thus well situated 
to adjudicate disciplinary appeals. 
Thus, if communities continue using appellate procedures like 
arbitration in cases of disciplinary appeals, this Article proposes several 
steps that communities could take to balance the need for impartiality and 
with the community interest in democratic accountability. For example, 
communities could follow the lead of cities like Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
and Fullerton, California, in giving arbitrators narrower standards of 
 
42 See infra Section V.A (proposing that appellate review authority be vested in actors like city 
councils, mayors, city managers, or civilian review boards). 
43 For example, in Murrieta, California, officers have the ability to appeal punishment handed 
down by the police chief to the City Manager. The City Manager must then hold a hearing, where 
he or she determines whether the punishment is supported by evidence. While employees can 
challenge the City Manager’s decision to advisory arbitration, the arbitrator’s decision is not binding 
on the city. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Murrieta and the Murrieta 
Police Officers Association 5-10 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Murrieta]. Other 
cities allow for officers to appeal disciplinary decisions to an arbitrator, but they make these arbitrators’ 
decisions advisory. In such cases they often give power to the City Manager, or a similar actor, to 
determine the final disposition. See, e.g., City of Oxnard, Memorandum of Understanding Between 
City of Oxnard and Oxnard Peace Officers’ Association 21-23 (2016), https://www.oxnard.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/OPOA-MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/26EC-6AQP] (giving the City 
Manager authority to depart from the “advisory recommendation of the arbitrator,” including to 
impose “new and more severe discipline”). 
44 Cf. Ofer, supra note 38, at 1050 (“Police officers who are accused of wrongdoing must be 
fully protected from false accusations and must enjoy the full range of due process protections in 
all stages of the investigatory and disciplinary process, including . . . the right to appeal the 
substantiation or the discipline.”). 
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review,45 or limiting their ability to reduce punishment if the evidence 
supports the alleged violation.46 Such a move would provide more deference 
to disciplinary decisions made by democratically accountable 
representatives of the community, while still empowering theoretically 
disinterested third parties like arbitrators to provide relief in cases of truly 
arbitrary or capricious punishment. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background 
information on the sources of internal disciplinary procedures, including 
appellate procedures, in American police departments. It focuses specifically 
on police union contracts, civil service laws, and law enforcement officer bills 
of rights as the primary sources of these appellate procedures. Part II reviews 
the limited existing empirical literature on police disciplinary appeals. Part 
III lays out the methodology, and Part IV presents the results of this study. 
Finally, Part V offers some normative recommendations for increasing 
democratic accountability and transparency in police disciplinary appeals. 
I. THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINARY PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS 
Modern policing scholars widely recognize that individual acts of 
officer misconduct are often symptoms of broader organizational 
deficiencies within law enforcement agencies.47 Thus, in order to address 
police misconduct effectively, the law must not only punish “bad apples,”48 
but also incentivize the nation’s roughly 18,000 state and local police 
 
45 For example, the Grand Rapids contract states that an arbitrator “shall be limited to a 
determination of the facts only and shall have no authority to modify the discipline imposed if the 
facts support the violation.” This effectively means that the arbitrator can review the factual 
sufficiency of the allegations against an officer, but the arbitrator cannot exercise their own 
personal judgment about the proper punishment. Agreement Between City of Grand Rapids and 
the Grand Rapids Police Officer Association, Office and Sergeant Unit 6 (2016), 
https://www.grandrapidsmi.gov/files/assets/public/departments/administrative-services/files/labor-union-
contracts/police-officers-and-sergeants-contract-070116-063019.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7LL-AYCG]. 
46 The Fullerton contract says that an arbitration may not overrule, reverse, or modify a city’s 
decision unless in the arbitrator finds the city has violated the terms of the contract, or if the city’s 
decision is “arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable.” Agreement Between 
the City of Fullerton and the Fullerton Police Officers Association Police Safety Unit 45 (2015), 
https://www.cityoffullerton.com/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=23642 [https://perma.cc/BRT6-
B22Y] [hereinafter City of Fullerton]. 
47 See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 493-514 (2004) (arguing that police misconduct is caused in part by 
organizational deficiencies). 
48 See Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 135 (2016) 
(“After all, every large organization will have a few bad apples. In the absence of any national 
statistics on local behavior, it can be difficult . . . to prove that an individual act of police misconduct 
is connected to a broader problem within a police department.”). 
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departments49 to implement rigorous internal oversight and disciplinary 
procedures. The law primarily relies on a handful of external, legal 
mechanisms50 to do this: the exclusionary rule,51 criminal prosecution,52 and 
 
49 Reaves, supra note 31. 
50 This list, of course, leaves off other major forms of police regulation like structural reform 
litigation and state licensing or accreditation, which have received some scholarly discussion—although 
less so than the exclusionary rule, criminal prosecution, and civil litigation. See, e.g., Roger L. Goldman 
& Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 546 (2001) (“Without a mechanism at the state or national level to remove the 
certificate of law enforcement officials who engage in such misconduct, it is likely that there will be 
more such instances of repeated misconduct.”). See generally, Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of 
Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2008) (arguing for a more collaborative approach to § 14141 
enforcement); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens 
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1417 (2000) (offering a normative 
recommendation for improving the DOJ’s use of § 14141 litigation); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting 
Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (offering normative 
recommendations for improving the DOJ’s implementation of § 14141); Stephen Rushin, Federal 
Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3193 (2014) [hereinafter Rushin, Federal 
Enforcement] (assessing § 14141 implementation empirically); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform 
Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, 
Structural Reform Litigation] (providing an empirical assessment of the use of the DOJ’s 
implementation of § 14141). 
51 The exclusionary rule prohibits prosecutors from admitting evidence in criminal trials in 
state and federal courts obtained by police in violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (expanding the exclusionary rule to cover wrongdoing by state and local 
police, not just federal law enforcement); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
390-92 (1920) (extending the exclusionary rule to address both illegally obtained material and copies 
of illegally obtained material, establishing the groundwork for the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule at the 
federal level, but not applying it to the states), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Theoretically, the exclusionary rule deters officer misconduct by removing the incentive for 
such behavior. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The rule is calculated to prevent, 
not to repair. Its purpose is to deter . . . by removing the incentive to disregard it.”). However, 
there is debate about whether the exclusionary rule contributes to meaningful change in police 
departments. Compare William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 311, 359 (1991) (arguing that, with sufficient institutional support, the exclusion rule can 
stand as a significant deterrent against police misconduct), and Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, 
The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1016, 1017 (1987) (finding that the Chicago Police Department underwent some reforms after 
implementation of exclusionary rule), with GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 322-23 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing the exclusionary rule is 
ineffective at bringing about real change). 
52 Police officers can be subject to criminal prosecution at the state or federal level. At the 
federal level, under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012), police officers can be subject to criminal prosecution if 
their conduct willfully deprives someone of their constitutional rights. At the state level, prosecutors 
can bring charges against police officers for any criminal law violation, subject to the usual 
protections afforded to criminal suspects, including criminal defenses like self-defense. Scholars 
recognize that only a small subset of police misconduct constitute criminal acts, making it an 
underinclusive method for addressing the wide range of officer misconduct. See Debra Livingston, 
Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 
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civil litigation.53 Each of these mechanisms penalizes individual acts of 
unlawful behavior by frontline police officers, which in the aggregate should 
theoretically force rational police supervisors to enact rigorous internal 
oversight and disciplinary procedures within their police agencies.54 
But for decades, researchers have lamented the apparent failure of these 
external mechanisms to usher in the desired organizational reform. Scholars 
have offered a wide range of explanations for the failure of these mechanisms. 
Some have argued that, because of the organization of municipal governments, 
police departments fail to internalize the costs imposed by civil judgments.55 
Others have pointed out that courts have established dozens of exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule, making it less effective at discouraging officer 
 
842 n.138 (1999) (“[C]riminal law standards define ‘the outer limits of what is permissible in 
society’—not the good police practices that police reformers aspire to institute in a wayward 
department.” (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 101 (1995))). 
53 Victims of police misconduct can file civil suit in federal district court, if the officer’s conduct 
violated their constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). But in order to be successful, individuals 
must overcome the qualified immunity doctrine, wherein government actors are exempt from civil 
liability unless they are violating a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[].” Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41 (2002) (defining 
what makes a right clearly established); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-18 (1999) (providing a 
clearer definition of when a right is clearly established); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-08 (1982) (limiting 
the availability of civil suit in cases where a public official is protected by qualified immunity). 
Individuals can also file suit against a police department or municipality, but only if they can show 
that the officer’s conduct was caused by the employer’s deliberate indifference in its failure to train 
or oversee its employee. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989) (establishing the deliberate 
indifference in a failure to train as the standard for municipal liability); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (upholding municipal liability for § 1983 claims in 
some cases). Some research suggests § 1983 may bring about reform in police departments. See, 
e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE 
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 95 (2009) (showing that insurance companies pushed 
reform in police departments in response to the expansion of municipal liability). Nevertheless, 
indemnification policies in municipalities seem to undermine many of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying the court’s doctrine on § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (showing the prevalence of indemnification 
policies across American police departments). 
54 In my previous research, I have described each of these existing responses to police 
misconduct as “cost-raising” regulations. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 50, at 
1352 (“That is to say, these traditional approaches attempt to dissuade police wrongdoing by 
raising the potential costs of such behavior. They cannot force police departments to adopt 
proactive reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.”). 
55 See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police 
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 495 
(2009) (showing how the organization of municipal governments often means that municipalities 
do not properly internalize the consequences of police misconduct). See generally Joanna C. 
Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 144 (2016) 
(providing a detailed empirical assessment of how many communities pay for the costs of police 
officer misconduct and finding that budgetary arrangements often lessen the impact of these 
lawsuits on police agencies). 
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wrongdoing.56 And still others have recognized that, for a number of practical 
and structural reasons, officers are rarely subject to criminal punishment.57 
An emerging thread of scholarship has shown that police supervisors face 
another significant hurdle in responding to officer misconduct: a complex web 
of labor and employment laws that define the procedural requirements police 
supervisors must follow when investigating or punishing officers for 
misconduct.58 These labor and employment protections come from several 
sources: police union contracts, law enforcement officer bills of rights, and 
civil service statutes. These three sources also frequently articulate the 
procedures used by police officers appealing internal disciplinary action. The 
following sections will address each in turn, while focusing specifically on 
how these mechanisms establish the disciplinary appeals process in 
American police departments. 
A. Police Union Contracts 
Police officers are a relatively “new addition to the labor movement.”59 For 
much of American history, police officers did not have the legal right to 
unionize, in part because of the “disastrous Boston Police Department Strike 
of 1919, in which over a thousand officers—about two-thirds of Boston’s police 
force at the time—made a bid for higher pay and better hours by walking off 
the job or refusing to report for duty,” leading to riots, property damage, and 
 
56 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504-27 (1996) (detailing how the Supreme Court 
has gradually recognized numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule); see also United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984) (establishing a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule); 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984) (establishing the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960) (striking down the silver platter 
doctrine); Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 183 (2012) (explaining 
how the exclusionary rule only applies to public law enforcement, and not private police agents). 
57 For example, of the thousands of cases of police officers killing civilians from 2005 through 
2015, the Washington Post only found evidence that fifty-four officers were charged for any crimes. 
Kimbriell Kelly & Kimberly Kindy, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted 
[https://perma.cc/KH47-EC66]. 
58 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012) (describing 
collective bargaining as a sort of “tax” on police reform); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental 
Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205-17 (2014) (discussing how labor laws and collective 
bargaining agreements can “frustrate attempts to discipline individual officers” by “giv[ing] line 
officers more authority to define the police role”). 
59 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1203. 
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numerous deaths.60 It would be decades after the Boston riots before police 
began, in earnest, to win the right to unionize and collectively bargain.61 
Today, the tide has turned dramatically. The majority of police officers are 
part of police unions,62 and police unionization has strong supporters on both 
sides of the political aisle.63 State statutes on the topic generally permit police 
officers to bargain collectively on any matter related to wages, hours, and 
other conditions of employment. Terms like “wages” and “hours” give police 
unions the right to negotiate about anything that affects compensation or 
benefits, either directly or indirectly.64 Terms like “conditions of 
employment” present some interpretive complexity. If read broadly, this sort 
of language can become a “catchall phrase into which almost any proposal may 
fall.”65 To prevent such a broad interpretation, courts and state labor relations 
boards have found that so-called managerial prerogatives are not subject to 
collective bargaining as conditions of employment.66 For all practical 
purposes, though, courts have held that many disciplinary procedures qualify 
as conditions of employment rather than managerial prerogatives.67 
 
60 Stoughton, supra note 58, at 2206; see also JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE: 1900–1962, at 14 (2004) 
(chronicling how these events led to court opinions, labor opponents, and policymakers frequently 
citing the Boston strike “as a cautionary tale of the evils of such [police] unions”). 
61 Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 736 (2017) 
(“Unions finally succeeded in gaining a lasting foothold in American police departments in the late 
1960s, as rank-and-file officers felt attacked by the civil rights movement’s focus on police brutality and 
racism and by federal court decisions limiting police officers’ investigatory and arrest powers.”). 
62 According to one estimate, there are five states that explicitly bar police unionization under 
state law: Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennesse, and Virginia. MILLA SANES & JOHN 
SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 4-5 (2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-
2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LVN-RD9V]. Four states have no clear statutory mandate on the 
topic: Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, and Wyoming. Id. The remaining states either permit or 
require collective bargaining in police departments. Id. This means that, according to one estimate, 
around sixty-six percent of police officers are employed by departments that engage in collective 
bargaining. REAVES, supra note 32, at 13. 
63 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1206 (“[P]olitical leaders on both sides of the aisle who once rejected 
police unionization as a threat to public safety have now widely embraced it.”). 
64 Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public Employment 
Relations, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3, at 242, 249-50 (1978) (showing that courts have generally 
understood terms like “wages” to permit public employees to bargain about wages or salaries, fringe 
benefits, health insurance, life insurance, retirement benefits, sick leave, vacation time, and other 
forms of indirect compensation). 
65 Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex. App. 1999). 
66 See Tussey, supra note 64, at 249. 
67 See, e.g., City of Casselberry v. Orange Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 482 So. 2d 336, 337-
38, 340-41 (Fla. 1986) (concluding that municipalities must bargain collectively on issues of 
discharge and demotion as needed to provide alternative grievance procedures); City of Reno v. 
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 653 P.2d 156, 158 (Nev. 1982) (upholding state labor relations agency’s 
determination that a city must negotiate in good faith with a police department over disciplinary 
procedures); Union Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No. 112, 766 
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Some research has explored the ways that the collective bargaining 
process may contribute to internal policies and procedures that thwart police 
accountability efforts.68 These studies have found that police union contracts 
frequently include language that impedes officer investigation and oversight 
by delaying officer interrogations,69 limiting civilian oversight,70 expunging 
records of prior officer misconduct,71 and more.72 At least one study has 
 
N.E.2d 1027, 1031, 1034 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the department must bargain 
collectively over disciplinary procedures); but c.f. Berkeley Police Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a policy allowing members of a citizen review 
board to meet and confer with the police union any time a new civil oversight mechanism was 
being implemented constituted a “management level decision[] . . . not properly within the scope 
of union representation and collective bargaining”); Local 346, Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. 
Labor Relations Comm’n, 462 N.E.2d 96, 101-03 (Mass. 1984) (determining that use of a polygraph 
was not a condition of employment because of overriding policy interest in officer accountability); 
State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n, 634 A.2d 478, 493 (N.J. 1993) (limiting the applicability to 
police unions of a statutory requirement that governments and public employee unions engage in 
collective bargaining over certain disciplinary procedures). 
68 See generally DERAY MCKESSON ET AL., CAMPAIGN ZERO, POLICE UNION CONTRACTS 
AND POLICE BILL OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdfe28a1f0/1467217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Unio
n+Contract+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5U3-GB3V] (analyzing the contents of police union 
contracts from eighty-one large American cities to show how some provisions may thwart 
accountability efforts); Fisk & Richardson, supra note 61 (providing a summary of how police 
unions can both thwart and promote accountability, and of the ways that police union contracts 
can impair reasonable accountability efforts); Rushin, supra note 30 (providing an analysis of labor 
laws that influence police internal disciplinary procedures, analyzing a dataset of 178 police union 
contracts, and offering normative recommendations on how to reform the law to diminish the 
number of barriers to accountability).  
69 See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal 
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, at 6 (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.chicago.gov/content/
dam/city/depts/dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA2012-2017_2.20.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U339-Z865] [hereinafter City of Chicago] (providing a minimum forty-eight 
hour waiting period from the time an officer is informed of a request for an interview in relation 
to a disciplinary investigation, with some exceptions for particular circumstances). 
70 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Baltimore City Police Department 
and the Baltimore City Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. Unit I, at 22 (Jan. 21, 2015) (on 
file with author) (barring civilian participation on certain disciplinary hearing boards). 
71 See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Cleveland and the Cleveland 
Police Patrolmen’s Association Non-Civilian Personnel, at 7 (Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Cleveland 
Collective Bargaining Agreement] (on file with author) (requiring the removal of verbal and written 
reprimands of officers after six months, and mandating that “all other disciplinary actions or 
penalties . . . be removed after two years from the date the discipline was administered”). 
72 See generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT AND THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY (2015), http://
samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/BALTIMORE-POLICE-UNION-CONTRACTFinal.pdf 
(describing how the law enforcement officer bill of rights in Maryland and the Baltimore police union 
contract can impede accountability); SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE UNION CONTRACT “WAITING 
PERIODS” FOR MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2015), 
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf (rejecting the need for 
waiting periods in cases of officer interrogations); Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts 
Shield Officers From Scrutiny and Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:16 PM GMT), 
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speculated that the structure of the collective bargaining process and the 
political power of police unions may be contributing to regulatory capture, 
whereby police unions are able to obtain unreasonably generous protections 
from disciplinary oversight.73 And a compelling new study by Professors 
Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams, and John Rappaport has 
found that the introduction of collective bargaining to sheriffs’ departments 
in Florida corresponded with a statistically significant uptick in misconduct 
complaints.74 In response, some scholars have argued for more transparency 
in the collective bargaining process,75 while others support the inclusion of 
minority unions during negotiations.76 Overall, the existing literature seems 
to suggest that police union contracts may make it more difficult to bring 
about reform in problematic police departments.77 
Despite the growing scholarship on police unions and collective 
bargaining, the existing literature has given little attention to the topic of 
disciplinary appeals. One study observed that police union contracts 
frequently require the arbitration of disciplinary appeals.78 Overall, though, 
disciplinary appeals flowing from union contracts have received little 
concerted attention from legal scholars. This is an important oversight 
because emerging evidence suggests that union contracts may establish 
particularly cumbersome disciplinary appeals procedures that seem to 
unfairly advantage officers facing suspensions or terminations. 
Take, for example, a recent case in Cleveland, Ohio. There, the city 
attempted to fire six officers who jointly fired 137 shots in 19.3 seconds at two 
unarmed civilians inside their car.79 The terms of the Cleveland police union 
 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5DQB-J9XZ] 
(reporting on an analysis of eighty-two police union contracts from large American cities which found a 
“pattern of protections” for officers that also constituted “hurdles for residents filing abuse complaints”). 
73 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1215-16 (describing why regulatory capture is theoretically plausible 
in the police union negotiation process). 
74 Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, The Effect of Collective 
Bargaining on Law Enforcement: Evidence from Florida 25 (U. Chi., Pub. L. Working Paper No. 655, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095217. 
75 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 30 at 1243-51 (calling for improved transparency in the negotiation 
of police union contracts and considering some of the limitations of such a policy position). 
76 See, e.g., Fisk & Richardson, supra note 61, at 777-97 (describing how policymakers could 
empower new labor organizations to engage in a form of limited minority union bargaining). 
77 See Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 50, at 3196 (using the term “cost-raising” to 
describe these sorts of regulations). 
78 See Rushin, supra note 30, at 1238-39 (finding that 115 of 178 police union contracts 
analyzed “contain language that permits or requires the use of arbitration in adjudicating officer 
appeals of disciplinary measures”). 
79 Evan McDonald, Six Cleveland Police Officers Fired, Six Suspended for Roles in Deadly Chase and 
Shooting, PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/
2016/01/ six_cleveland_police_officer_f.html [https://perma.cc/C2PM-SM4C]. The incident in 
question began when an officer observed the civilian driving the car, Timothy Russell, failed to use 
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contract gave each officer the right to challenge any termination to a third-
party arbitrator, who issues a final decision that is binding on all parties.80 
The union contract also gave the arbitrator seemingly expansive authority to 
re-litigate all of the factual and legal determinations made by the city during 
earlier disciplinary proceedings.81 In that case, the assigned arbitrator 
ultimately ordered the city to rehire five of the six officers involved in the 
deadly shooting, over the fierce objections of city leaders.82 
These sorts of anecdotal accounts provide only limited insight. They do 
not tell us whether union contracts across the country frequently offer such 
protective disciplinary appeals procedures. Given the lack of research on how 
union contracts affect disciplinary appeals procedures, there appears to be 
substantial room for future research. 
B. Law Enforcement Officer Bills of Rights 
In addition to collective bargaining agreements, law enforcement officer 
bills of rights (LEOBRs) also set strict limits on some types of internal 
disciplinary action. These are state statutes passed via the legislative process 
designed to provide a unique level of protection to all officers within a state.83 
For example, Maryland’s LEOBR prevents localities from punishing officers 
 
his turn signal, and attempted to execute a traffic stop. Ida Lieszkovszky, Everything You Need to Know 
Before the Start of the Trial for Cleveland Police Officer Michael Brelo, PLAIN DEALER (April 6, 2015), 
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2015/04/everything_you_need_to_know_be.html 
[https://perma.cc/E2KR-G4ML]. Russell failed to stop, and instead led officers on a twenty-two 
mile chase. McDonald, supra. At various points, upwards of sixty-two squad cars were involved in 
the case, before it ended near a local middle school. Lieszkovszky, supra. When one officer opened 
fire on the vehicle, twelve other officers joined in. Id. The officers fired a total of 137 shots in 19.3 
seconds at the vehicle, hitting both Russell and Williams over 20 times each, killing both of them 
instantly. McDonald, supra. Later investigations confirmed that both Russell and Williams were 
apparently unarmed. Id. 
80 Specifically, the union contract states that “[d]iscipline shall fall under the grievance 
procedure,” meaning that officers have the right to challenge disciplinary action through up to four 
layers of disciplinary review, ultimately culminating in a challenge before a third-party arbitrator, 
selected “in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Cleveland 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 71, at 42-44. The decision by the arbitrator is 
considered “binding on the City, the Union, and the members . . .” and contract provides virtually 
no guidance on the limits of the arbitrator’s authority to re-review all disciplinary findings. Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Adam Ferrise, Michael Brelo Stays Fired, Other Officers Involved in ‘137-Shots’ Chase Get 
Jobs Back, Cleveland (June 13, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/06/
michael_brelo_stays_fired_othe.html [https://perma.cc/2GDK-L88W]. 
83 These state statutes emerged in part because of the decision in Garrity v. New Jersey where 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the state could not use compelled statements from disciplinary 
interviews in later criminal prosecutions. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1220-23 (2016) (discussing how LEOBRs arose as a response to police unions 
feeling that Garrity had not gone far enough, and that they still possessed fewer constitutional 
protections than other citizens). 
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for any “brutality” unless someone files a complaint within 366 days.84 It also 
allows the removal of civilian complaints from officer personnel files after three 
years.85 Louisiana’s LEOBR provides officers with up to thirty days to secure 
counsel before investigators can interview them about alleged misconduct.86 In 
Florida, the LEOBR requires investigators to provide an officer under 
investigation with all evidence related to the investigation before beginning an 
interrogation.87 This includes the name of all complainants, physical evidence, 
incident reports, GPS locational data, audio evidence, and video recordings.88 
In Illinois, the LEOBR bars the consideration of anonymous civilian 
complaints.89 And in Delaware, the LEOBR bars municipalities from requiring 
officers to disclose personal assets as a condition of employment.90 These only 
scratch the surface of the protective procedures offered by LEOBRs to police 
officers facing internal investigations. 
There has been a surge of recent scholarship describing the content and 
policy implications of LEOBRs. Kevin M. Keenan and Professor Samuel 
Walker conducted the most comprehensive empirical study of LEOBRs to 
date. They coded the content of fourteen LEOBRs for fifty separate 
variables.91 Based on this coding, they concluded that a number of LEOBRs 
contained unreasonably protective procedures that arguably thwarted 
reasonable accountability and oversight.92 Similarly, a study by Professors 
Aziz Z. Huq and Richard H. McAdams identified twenty existing 
LEOBRs, which often establish so-called “interrogation buffers,” such as 
“delay privileges” that impair officer accountability by mandating a delay 
period before an officer may be interviewed or interrogated.93 Additionally, 
a number of media outlets have begun to recognize the ways that LEOBRs 
 
84 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(c) (West 2019). 
85 Id. § 3-110(a). 
86 LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2531(4)(a) (2019). 
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.532(d) (2019). 
88 Id. 
89 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 725/3.8(b) (2019) (“Anyone filing a complaint against a sworn peace 
officer must have the complaint supported by a sworn affidavit.”). 
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9202 (2019). 
91 See generally Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An 
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185 (2005). 
92 Id. at 241-42 (concluding that there are five distinct provisions found in some LEOBRs, 
both existing and proposed, and several other identifiable problem areas, that serve as potential 
barriers to police accountability). 
93 Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge 
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. L. FORUM 213, 222 (identifying twenty 
states that have LEOBRs on the books that “regulate how administrative investigators can 
interview or interrogate police officers . . . in a disciplinary investigation,” nine of which include 
some form of delay privilege). 
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can tip the scales in favor of the officer during disciplinary cases.94 Other 
scholars, like Professor Kate Levine, have argued that some components of 
LEOBRs—particularly limits on abusive interrogation techniques—ought 
to serve as a blueprint for how the law could protect the rights of criminal 
suspects during criminal interrogations.95 
While each of these past studies has made an important contribution to 
the field, the existing scholarship on LEOBRs spends little time discussing 
the topic of disciplinary appeals. This may be in part because, as one study 
found, LEOBRs often do not provide appellate procedures.96 Instead, they 
tend to provide limitations on the investigation and initial adjudication of 
internal disciplinary matters. 
C. Civil Service Statutes 
Finally, the majority of states and the District of Columbia have given 
public employees, including police officers, additional employment 
protection via civil service laws.97 These laws emerged, in part, as an attempt 
to ensure that government jobs were allocated based on merit, rather than 
political patronage.98 While these laws initially focused on the hiring and 
discharge of civil servants, they now cover at least eighty percent of state and 
local government employees, and their focus has expanded to include 
“demotions, transfers, layoffs and recalls, discharges, . . . grievances, pay and 
benefit determinations, and classification of positions.”99 
Because they often apply equally to all large classes of government 
employees across an entire state, civil service laws operate as a “floor for police 
 
94 See, e.g., Eli Hager, Blue Shield: Did you Know Police Have Their Own Bill of Rights?, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (April 27, 2015), http://www.themarshallproject.com/2015/04/27/blue-shield 
[https://perma.cc/RFZ9-NVPK] (noting that “[a]s many as 11 other states are considering similar 
legislation, and many of the rest have written essentially the same rights and privileges into their 
contracts with police unions.”). 
95 Levine, supra note 83, at 1212. 
96 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1266 app. c (showing that no existing LEOBR appears to elaborate 
procedures for arbitration on appeal). 
97 For some representative examples of legislation establishing a civil service system for 
law enforcement officers, see ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-180 to 190 (2008), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 38-1001 to 1007 (1956), ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-51-301 to 311 (2013 & Supp. 2015), COLO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 31-30-101 to 107 (2016), and D.C. CODE §§ 5-101.01 to 5.133-21, 5-1302 to 5-1305 
(2001 & Supp. 2016). At least a few states do not appear to have civil service systems that would 
cover local law enforcement officers. 
98 See ROBERT G. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 1-3 (1976). Historians 
have traced the origins of modern civil service statutes to the assassination of President James 
Garfield in 1881 by a “disappointed officer seeker” which contributed to the passage of the 
Pendleton Act two years later. Id. 
99 Ann C. Hodges, The Interplay of Civil Service Law and Collective Bargaining Law in Public 
Sector Employee Discipline Cases, 32 B.C. L. REV. 95, 102 (1990). 
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officer employment protections, which police unions can raise through 
collective bargaining,” or through LEOBRs.100 
Outside of police union contracts, LEOBRs, and civil service statutes, 
departmental regulations and city ordinances also commonly establish 
the boundaries of acceptable practices during internal investigations of 
police officers.101 
II. EXISTING RESEARCH ON DISCIPLINARY APPEALS  
While some studies have shed important light on how union contracts 
and LEOBRs establish problematic internal disciplinary procedures, there 
has been little research evaluating the disciplinary appeals process used in 
American police departments.102 And the limited existing research on 
police disciplinary appeals has been outcome oriented. That is to say, the 
existing research focuses on the outcomes of police disciplinary appeals, not 
the procedures that contributed to those outcomes. This small body of 
literature suggests that police disciplinary appeals frequently result in the 
reduction of officer punishment. 
For example, Mark Iris conducted two important empirical examinations 
of the effect of appellate arbitration on disciplinary outcomes in Houston 
and Chicago.103 He found that in Houston between 1994 and 1998, and in 
Chicago between 1990 and 1993, arbitrators regularly reduced or overturned 
officer suspensions and firings.104 Similarly, Tyler Adams recently conducted 
a valuable national study of ninety-two police arbitrator decisions published 
by the Bloomberg Law’s Labor and Employment Law Resource Center 
between 2011 and 2015.105 He coded these arbitration decisions to identify 
common justifications for arbitrators overturning police discipline on 
 
100 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1208. 
101 This study does not look at these local ordinances or internal departmental policies. 
This means that, if anything, this study underrepresents the frequency of use of each of the 
elements described below. See infra Part IV. 
102 For example, some of the existing studies have discussed the internal investigation process, 
or the initial disciplinary decision-making process. All of these are important subjects for scholarly 
consideration. But they are distinguishable from the disciplinary appeals process. One study, though, 
did code for the presence of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. See Rushin, supra 
note 30, at 1238-39 (showing that 115 of the 178 contracts examined as part of that study appeared to 
permit or require binding arbitration in cases of disciplinary appeals). 
103 See generally Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 215 (1998); Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Houston: The Arbitration Experience, 
5 POLICE Q. 132 (2002). 
104 Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago, supra note 103, at 216; Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, 
supra note 103, at 141-43. 
105 See generally Tyler Adams, Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does It 
Take to Fire a Bad Cop? 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133 (2016). 
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appeal.106 He found that arbitrators often cited inadequate departmental 
investigations, a lack of proof about the guilt of discharged officers, failure 
by investigators to adhere to procedural requirements during officer 
investigations, and mitigating factors in an officer’s personnel file to justify 
appellate relief from disciplinary action.107 
These findings are roughly consistent with a number of examinations 
conducted by media outlets. For example, Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery, 
and Steven Rich of the Washington Post found that, of the 1,881 officers fired 
for officer misconduct in the nation’s largest police departments over the last 
several years, the disciplinary appeals process reinstated the employment of 
over 450 of these officers.108 They found that the disciplinary appeals process 
forced the Philadelphia Police Department to rehire sixty-two percent of 
officers fired for misconduct during this time period.109 Similarly, the 
disciplinary appeals process used by the Denver Police Department resulted 
in the rehiring of sixty-eight percent of terminated officers.110 And in San 
Antonio, the police department had to rehire an astounding seventy percent 
of officers it had fired, because of disciplinary appeals.111 Similarly, Robert 
Angien and Dan Horn of the Cincinnati Enquirer found that between 1997 
and 2001, roughly one in every four officer suspensions or terminations were 
reversed or reduced on appeal.112 
Combined, the existing literature presents compelling evidence that the 
disciplinary appeals process may serve as a barrier to officer accountability. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a critical gap in the existing literature. Little 
academic research has comprehensively examined and described the 
procedural process employed in disciplinary appeals across a substantial cross-
section of American police departments. More specifically, the existing 
literature has not provided a comprehensive, descriptive account of how 
appeals of discipline work across the nation’s 18,000 police departments. How 
many levels of appeal are available to police officers facing disciplinary 
 
106 Id. at 133-34 (“Part III identifies the factors most significant in arbitrators’ decisions 
overturning police discharges and notes the particular importance of officers’ good character in 
decision reversing discharges.”). 
107 Based on these findings, Adams challenged the “Myth of the Untouchable Officer.” Id. at 155. 
108 Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, supra note 1. I discuss this study in more depth, infra Section IV.D. 
109 Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, supra note 1. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Robert Angien & Dan Horn, Police Discipline Inconsistent: Sanctions Most Likely to Be Reduced, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 21, 2001), http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/10/21/loc_police_discipline.html. 
Reporting out of local news outlets in Philadelphia has also exhibited concern for the ways 
that disciplinary appeals put problematic officers back on the streets. Dan Stamm, Police 
Commish Angry That 90 Percent of Fired Officers Get Jobs Back, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 28, 2013), 
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Police-Officers-Get-Jobs-Back-194100131.html 
[https://perma.cc/EGW2-RQUB]. 
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sanctions? How many police departments allow arbitrators or comparable 
third parties to have the final say in disciplinary appeals? How do communities 
select the identity of an arbitrator assigned to conduct a disciplinary appeal? 
And do communities limit the scope of an arbitrator’s authority on appeal? 
The answers to these questions—that is the procedural process used to 
adjudicate police disciplinary appeals—likely has a significant effect on the 
outcome of the appeal. For example, the manner by which police 
departments select an arbitrator can affect the frequency by which that 
arbitrator will overturn disciplinary action. If police supervisors unilaterally 
selected an arbitrator, then that arbitrator may feel pressure to approve of 
any punishments handed down by those supervisors. Conversely, if a police 
union unilaterally selected an arbitrator, then that arbitrator may feel 
pressure to overturn or reduce punishment against a union member. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many communities establish a designated 
list of acceptable arbitrators through union contracts,113 or employ a system 
whereby the police union and police supervisors “alternately strike names 
off [a designated] list; the last name remaining gets the assignment.”114 Such 
a selection process may contribute to arbitrator decisions that split the 
difference between supervisor and union demands, since siding too 
frequently with one side or the other might endanger an arbitrator’s selection 
in future cases through an alternate strike system.115 
The bottom line is that procedure matters. And there appears to be a 
descriptive gap in the literature when it comes to the procedures used to 
adjudicate disciplinary appeals in American police departments. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
As discussed above, it is challenging to understand fully the range of 
disciplinary appeals used across the thousands of decentralized American 
police departments. To begin understanding the kinds of disciplinary appeals 
procedures offered to police in the United States, this Article relies on a 
dataset of police union contracts. 116 Consistent with other recent studies of 
 
113 Iris found that Chicago is one of the communities that employs such a permanent panel of 
designated arbitrators. See Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, supra note 103, at 146. 
114 Id. (identifying Houston as a city that has employed such an alternate strike system). 
115 Interestingly, Iris found that the manner by which communities select arbitrators does 
not seem to predict the ways in which arbitrators later rule. Id. at 146-47 (“That the means 
through which arbitrators are selected in Houston and Chicago are so different yet produce such 
similar results . . . .”). This Article finds more evidence to bolster this anecdotal finding by Iris, 
as discussed in Part V. 
116 Because of the long process of collecting and coding these contracts, plus the long editing 
and publication process, some of these contracts may no longer be active by the time this Article 
comes out in print. Nevertheless, this should not affect the overall claims from this Article. This 
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police policies, this dataset focuses on municipal police departments, rather 
than sheriff ’s departments, state highway patrols, or other specialized law 
enforcement agencies.117 Public records requests, searches of municipal 
websites, searches of state repositories, and web searches resulted in the 
collection of police union contracts from 656 municipal agencies serving large 
and midsized communities across the country. This dataset builds on, and 
would not have been possible without, the important efforts of other 
researchers who have also collected police union contracts, including the 
Better Government Association, Campaign Zero,118 the Combined Law 
Enforcement Associations of Texas,119 the Guardian,120 Labor Relations 
Information Systems,121 and Reuters.122 A complete list of the departments 
studied as part of this dataset is available in the Appendix. The dataset covers 
police officers in forty-two states that permit police unionization. 
Approximately sixty-one percent of the contracts in this dataset come 
from municipal websites, eighteen percent from state websites, five percent 
from police association or union websites, and two percent from media 
reports. Another three percent of these contracts were only available through 
previous union contract collections by other organizations which make some 
contracts available online.123 Finally, I obtained the remaining approximately 
eleven percent of contracts through open record requests, as they are not 
otherwise publicly available. The municipal departments covered in this 
 
Article merely claims that a large number of municipalities utilize common disciplinary appeals 
processes. There is no reason to think that there has been any substantial change over the last several 
years in disciplinary appeals procedures across a large number of communities. And given the size 
of the dataset and the overwhelming consistency among jurisdictions, there is no reason to think 
that this inevitable limitation has skewed the overall results in any significant way. 
117 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. 
L. REV. 395, 423-24 (2016) (coding police body camera policies from the largest 100 municipal police 
departments); Rushin, supra note 30, at 1217-19 (coding police union contracts from municipalities 
with at least 100,000 residents). 
118 See MCKESSON ET AL., supra note 68 (collecting and coding eighty-one police union 
contracts from the largest one hundred municipal police departments). 
119 See Contracts, COMBINED LAW ENF’T ASS’NS TEX., https://www.cleat.org/contracts 
[https://perma.cc/37EK-347A] (making numerous contracts from Texas available through their website) 
120 See George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will Be Kept 
Secret, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-files-
contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret [https://perma.cc/V83L-Y8TJ] (discussing the 
contents of sixty-seven contracts leaked as part of a hack of the Fraternal Order of Police). 
121 See Contract Library, LABOR RELATIONS INFO. SYS., https://www.lris.com/contracts/index.php 
[https://perma.cc/J9BA-VQDN] (providing a database of union contracts from a number of police 
departments across the country). 
122 See Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and 
Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:16 PM GMT), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5DQB-J9XZ] (collecting the coding eighty-two contracts from 
the largest one hundred municipal police departments in the United States). 
123 Supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text. 
 
568 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 545 
dataset serve a total population of around ninety-seven million Americans. 
The median population served by this dataset is around 68,000 residents. 
This Article focuses specifically on union contracts rather than other 
sources of police disciplinary appeals. This Article does not code or explore 
the ways that law enforcement officer bills of rights (LEOBRs), civil service 
statutes, internal departmental policies, and municipal ordinances affect 
disciplinary appeals.124 This means that, the findings described in Part IV may 
actually underrepresent the frequency of these appellate procedures in 
communities that choose not to negotiate about appellate procedures during 
collective bargaining, but nonetheless provide similar protections to those 
described in this Article through LEOBRs, civil service statutes, municipal 
ordinances, or internal departmental policies. 
This Article also focuses specifically on mid-to-large municipal police 
departments. Thus, it is not necessarily generalizable to all police departments, 
particularly those in small, nonunionized municipalities. While a large number 
of police officers in the United States are members of unions, there may be 
reasons to believe that disciplinary appeals procedures differ in unionized and 
nonunionized agencies. Nevertheless, given the relative ubiquity of police 
unionization,125 and given the fact that disciplinary appellate procedures are 
often considered appropriate topics for collective bargaining,126 this dataset 
provides detailed insight into the disciplinary appellate procedures used across 
a large segment of unionized police departments. 
Before coding the dataset for this Article, I first identified relevant coding 
variables and definitions. To do this in a manner consistent with prior studies 
of police policies, I conducted a preliminary examination of the dataset and 
surveyed the existing literature discussed in Part II to identify recurring 
procedural elements of the disciplinary appeals process that may reduce 
democratic accountability or insulate officers from accountability.127 Through 
this iterative process, I settled on five coding variables, which I discuss in 
 
124 A reporter from the Marshall Project identified fourteen LEOBRs: California, Delaware, 
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Hager, supra note 94. In addition, based on analysis by 
Aziz Huq and Richard McAdams, a handful of other states appear to have statutes on the books that 
effectively function as LEOBRs, even if they may not be labeled as such. Huq & McAdams, supra 
note 93, at 222. Distinguishing between LEOBRs and civil service statutes can be difficult. Some 
LEOBRs are explicitly articulated separately from civil service statutes. Other times, it can be hard 
to distinguish between civil service statutes and LEOBRs. 
125 See REAVES, supra note 32, at 13 (finding that around two-thirds of officers are employed by 
departments that engage in collective bargaining). 
126 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1205-07. 
127 See, e.g., Fan, supra note 117, at 425 (describing the development of the coding book for a 
similar study of police body camera policies). 
2019] Police Disciplinary Appeals 569 
more detail in Part IV. Table 1 summarizes the definitions employed during 
the coding of the dataset. 
 
Table 1: Coding Variables and Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Appealable to Arbitration or 
Comparable Procedure 
Police officers may appeal 
disciplinary action to an arbitrator, 
or a comparable third party 
 
Significant Review Authority Arbitrator has de novo or comparable 
authority to rehear factual and/or legal 
determinations made by police 
supervisors (e.g., police chief), civilian 
review boards, or city officials 
 
Control Over Selection of 
Arbitrator or Comparable 
Police union or police officer has 
significant authority to select the 
identity of the arbitrator or third party 
that will hear the appeal (e.g., striking 
names from panel or demanding new 
panels) 
 
Arbitrator or Comparable Third 
Party Makes Final Decision 
The arbitrator or comparable third 
party has the final say in disciplinary 
decision, generally disclosing further 
review 
 
Levels of Appellate Review The numerical number of levels of 
appellate review an officer may utilize 
before a punishment becomes final 
 
Using the definitions from Table 1, the dataset underwent two rounds of 
coding to determine the number of municipalities that fall into each coding 
category—that is, to determine whether the police union contracts provided 
for a disciplinary appeal procedure that was consistent with the definition 
listed in Table 1. Given that the dataset included 656 police union contracts 
coded across 5 variables identified in Table 1, I ultimately made 3,280 coding 
decisions as part of this analysis. There was substantial agreement in the 
decisions rendered through each of these rounds of coding, suggesting a 
570 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 545 
relatively high level of reliability.128 Nevertheless, the binary nature of the 
coding used in this study sometimes lends itself to difficult choices. Not all 
contracts had provisions that neatly fit into these coding parameters. In these 
borderline cases, there is certainly room for reasonable disagreement. In a 
small percentage of cases—around one percent of all coding decisions—these 
two rounds of coding led to different decisions as to whether a police union 
contract satisfied one of the variable definitions listed in Table 1. In such cases, 
the union contract underwent a third and final round of coding. 
Given the large size of the dataset and the relatively small number of 
borderline cases, I do not believe the discretionary application of the 
variable definitions in Table 1 to these borderline cases resulted in any 
systematic error that would undermine the validity of the central findings 
of this Article. Additionally, the goal of this Article is not to analyze the 
disciplinary appeals procedures of any one police department. Thus, while 
coding such a large dataset will almost invariably introduce occasional 
inconsistencies, the methodology used in this Article is designed to provide 
a comprehensive evaluation of broad trends in disciplinary appeals 
procedures across a large cross-section of American police departments. A 
more detailed discussion of the methodology, particularly focused on the 
development of variable definitions used in this Article, is available in 
Appendix B. As Part IV explains, this coding revealed significant similarity 
across the disciplinary appeals procedures. 
IV. HOW POLICE DISCIPLINARY APPEALS LIMIT ACCOUNTABILITY 
The overwhelming majority of police departments in the dataset employ 
a similar disciplinary appeals process—one that, I argue, may theoretically 
shield officers from reasonable accountability efforts. Table 2 breaks down the 
frequency of each variable in the dataset. 
 




Appealable to Arbitration or Comparable 
Procedure 
72.9% 
Significant Review Authority 70.1% 
 
128 There was also one single coder used throughout. Thus, there is no reason for concern about 
the consistency of coding between multiple coders. See, e.g., id. 
2019] Police Disciplinary Appeals 571 
Control Over Selection of Arbitrator or 
Comparable Third Party 
54.3% 




In total, just under half (forty-eight percent) of all union contracts 
included in this dataset provide officers with all of the procedural 
protections discussed in Table 2. That is, they give officers the chance to 
appeal to an arbitrator, they give officers or unions some significant power 
to select the identity of the arbitrator, they provide this arbitrator with 
significant power to override earlier factual or legal decisions, and they 
make the arbitrator’s decision final and binding on the police department. 
And around seventy-one percent of cities provide officers with at least three 
of these procedural protections on appeal. 
The median police department in the dataset offers police officers up to 
four layers of appellate review in disciplinary cases. Some departments 
provided officers with as few as one layer of appellate review.129 Others 
provided officers with as many as six or seven levels of appellate review.130 
The subparts that follow discuss other common procedures offered to police 
officers appealing disciplinary action. 
A. Binding Arbitration 
Approximately seventy-three percent of the police departments use a 
disciplinary appeals process that involves some sort of outside arbitration. 
This includes the overwhelming majority of the largest American cities, 
 
129 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between Representatives of the City of Chino 
and the Chino Police Officers Association, Exhibit A, 6 (2015) (on file with author) (describing 
single layer of disciplinary appeals); Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Colton 
and the Colton Police Officers Association 4-10 (2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of 
Colton] (describing how appeals of suspensions in excess of three days, disciplinary salary 
reductions, demotions, and discharges automatically proceed to the final step of the grievance 
procedures—arbitration, and how appeals of minor disciplinary action involve a single layer of 
appeal to a head of department or designee). 
130 See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Edmond and the Fraternal Order of Police Local 136, 
at 10, 15-18 (2016) (on file with author) (providing for six layers of appellate review through the 
grievance procedure); Agreement Between City of Kettering, Ohio and Fraternal Order of Police, 
Kettering Lodge No. 92, Patrol Officers 13-15 (2015) (on file with author) (allowing seven stages of 
appeal through the city’s grievance procedures before binding arbitration occurs). 
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including Austin,131 Boston,132 Chicago,133 Cincinnati,134 Cleveland,135 
Columbus,136 Miami,137 and Omaha,138 as well as smaller and mid-sized cities 
like Billings, Montana,139 Edison, New Jersey,140 Flint, Michigan,141 Green 
Bay, Wisconsin,142 and Menlo Park, California.143 
In most jurisdictions however, police officers appealing disciplinary action 
do not immediately proceed to arbitration. Instead, officers generally have 
the ability to seek relief on appeal at various intermediary levels.144 For 
 
131 See Agreement Between the City of Austin and the Austin Police Association 49 (2013) 
(on file with author) (establishing procedures for police to appeal disciplinary action to expedited arbitration). 
132 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between City of Boston and Boston Police 
Patrolmen’s Association, Inc. 7-10 (2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Boston] 
(providing police officers with the ability to appeal disciplinary action to binding arbitration at 
step five of the grievance procedures). 
133 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 17, 84-85 (2012) (articulating the standard for 
binding arbitration on appeal). 
134 See Labor Agreement by and Between Queen City Lodge No. 69 Fraternal Order of Police 
and the City of Cincinnati, Non-Supervisors 2, 5 (2016) (on file with author) (allowing officers to 
proceed directly to final arbitration on appeal in cases of suspensions of more than five days without 
pay, discharge, demotion, or termination). 
135 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police 
Patrolmen’s Association (C.P.P.A.), Non-Civilian Personnel 44 (on file with author) (stating that 
the arbitration procedures articulated in the grievance procedure shall be “final, conclusive, and 
binding on the City, the Union, and the members.”). 
136 See Agreement Between City of Columbus and Fraternal Order of Police, Capital city 
Lodge No. 9 41-44 (2014) (on file with author) (allowing officers to proceed, at step five of the 
grievance procedure, to arbitration with the approval of the Lodge President). 
137 See Agreement Between City of Miami, Miami, Florida and Fraternal Order of Police, 
Walter E. Headley, Jr., Miami Lodge No. 20, 13-15 (2015) (on file with author) (establishing 
grievance procedures that permit arbitration at step four). 
138 See Agreement Between the City of Omaha, Nebraska and the Omaha Police Officers 
Association 15-17 (2014) (on file with author) (permitting arbitration on appeal at step three of 
the grievance procedure). 
139 See Montana, Agreement Between the City of Billings, Montana and Montana Public 
Employees Association, Billings Police Unit 6-9 (2015) (on file with author) (articulating 
arbitration procedure on appeal). 
140 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Township of Edison and Policemen’s 
Benevolent Association, Local No. 75, Inc. 49-51 (2014) (on file with author) (articulating 
standards for arbitration of grievances). 
141 See Agreement Between the City of Flint and Flint Police Officers Association 23, 35-39 
(2014) (on file with author) (allowing officers to pursue arbitration of disciplinary action). 
142 See Agreement Between City of Green Bay and Green Bay Professional Police Association 
6-7 (2016) (on file with author) (permitting binding arbitration on appeal). 
143 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Menlo Park Police Officers’ Association 
and the City of Menlo Park 21-22 (2015) (on file with author) (stating that officers can bring some 
disciplinary appeals to arbitration). 
144 For example, in Las Cruces, New Mexico, the union contract provides officers with the chance 
to first bring appeals to their immediate supervisor. See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Las 
Cruces and Fraternal Order of Police, Las Cruces Police Officer’s Association 49-51 (2017) (on file with 
author) (describing how, at step one, a grievant must first discuss their objection to disciplinary action 
with their immediate supervisor, and then with the Chief of Police). If the officer does not receive 
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example, the union contract in Midwest City, Oklahoma provides officers 
with the chance to first file an appeal with their supervisor.145 If the 
employee’s grievance remains unresolved after this initial step, they may next 
file a grievance with the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Grievance 
Committee.146 Thereafter the FOP Grievance Committee may submit the 
appeal to the next highest supervisor.147 Then, the Chief of Police has the 
ability to respond to the appeal, or the Chief may refer the matter to the 
Labor Management Review Board.148 If the officer fails to get relief on appeal 
after these initial steps, the appeal goes before the City Manager.149 And 
finally, if the grievance remains unresolved after review by the City Manager, 
the FOP may request binding arbitration.150 The procedures used in Midwest 
City, Oklahoma are consistent with those used by a large number of police 
departments in the dataset. At the end of the appeals process, officers 
frequently have the opportunity to present their appeal to an arbitrator. 
In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that employ arbitration on 
appeal, and in 68.7% of all jurisdictions analyzed as part of this study, the 
decision from this arbitration decision is final. Nevertheless, some 
communities like Independence, Missouri,151 and Indio, California,152 do not 
employ binding arbitration. Instead, these communities make arbitration 
advisory or permit additional review of arbitrators’ decisions. 
A number of scholars and media outlets have hypothesized that 
arbitration as an appellate mechanism may contribute to the frequent 
reversals of or reductions in internal disciplinary sanctions.153 According 
 
appellate relief through this initial layer of review, the department then permits an intermediary level 
of review at the level of the Chief of Police, and then the City Manager. Id. at 50. 
145 See Collective Bargaining Agreement for Fiscal Year 2017/2018 Between the Fraternal order 
of Police Lodge #127 and the City of Midwest City 10-15 (2017) (on file with author) (laying out the 
city’s procedures for disciplinary appeals). 
146 Id. at 12. 
147 Id. 
148 See id. at 13 (describing this procedure and establishing a time limit for action). 
149 See id. (“If the Grievance or Disciplinary Appeal is still unresolved after receipt of the answer from 
the Chief of Police, the Grievance or Disciplinary Appeal may be submitted to the City Manager . . . .”). 
150 See id. (“If the Grievance or Disciplinary Appeal is unresolved after receipt of the answer 
from the City Manager, the FOP may request that the matter be submitted to impartial arbitration.”). 
151 See Working Agreement Between City of Independence, Missouri, Police Department 
& Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 1, at 22 (2017) (on file with author) (giving the City 
Manager the ability to “modify a decision of the Grievance Board or an arbitrator” when the 
“finding of fact and decision based thereon are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence . . . together with the legitimate inferences”). 
152 See Indio Police Officers’ Association Comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding 
44-46 (2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Indio] (establishing advisory arbitration, 
rather than binding arbitration). 
153 See, e.g., Roger Goldman, Importance of State Law in Police Reform, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 363, 
365 (2016) (“And, even assuming the officer is fired for violating the Constitution or for other reasons, 
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to these hypotheses, arbitration is different from other forms of disciplinary 
appeals, in part because it limits community observation or participation. On 
this point, a number of jurisdictions in this study, like Colton, California,154 
require that all arbitration proceedings are conducted in private without 
public observation, while other cities like Corpus Christi, Texas,155 give 
officers the option to make arbitration proceedings private. 
Even so, arbitration by itself may not be problematic as a tool for adjudicating 
disciplinary appeals. But when combined with some of the features described in 
the next two Sections, arbitration may become a more problematic method of 
limiting democratic accountability in American police departments. 
B. Control over Selection of Arbitrator 
A little over fifty-four percent of all departments in the dataset give 
police officers or the police union significant authority in the selection of 
the arbitrator that will hear a case on appeal. Major cities including 
Boston,156 Chicago,157 Detroit,158 El Paso,159 Fort Worth,160 Honolulu,161 
 
in many jurisdictions, the collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration of the issue, and it 
is quite common for the officer to be put back on the job, leading to back pay and reinstatement.”). 
154 See City of Colton, supra note 129, at 7 (“Grievance arbitration hearings shall be private.”). 
155 See Agreement Between the City of Corpus Christi and the Corpus Christi Police Officers’ 
Association 20 (2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Corpus Christi] (“All hearings shall 
be public unless requested by the appealing employee that the hearing shall be closed to the public. 
In any event, the final decision of the arbitrator shall be public, although public announcement may 
be reasonably delayed upon request of the parties.”). It is worth noting that even in cities that use a 
city manager or other city agent to hear appellate cases, some still allow the officer to bar public 
observation of the proceeding. See City of Murrieta, supra note 43, at 8 (“The hearing may be open 
to the public or closed at the employee’s option.”). 
156 See City of Boston, supra note 132, at 9 (“The arbitrator shall be selected in a manner 
mutually agreed upon by the parties from a rotating panel of not less than three (3) and not more 
than five (5) arbitrators selected by mutual agreement of the parties.”). 
157 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 84 (establishing a panel of agreeable arbitrators 
between the city and the police union). 
158 See Master Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the Detroit Police Officers 
Association 11-12 (2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Detroit] (establishing an 
alternative striking procedure by which the union can remove potential arbitrators). 
159 See Articles of Agreement Between City of El Paso, Texas and El Paso Municipal Police 
Officers’ Association 42 (2014) (establishing a procedure for union and city to agree on panel of five 
individuals to serve terms as members of the hearing examiner panel). 
160 See Meet and Confer Labor Agreement Between City of Fort Worth, Texas and Fort 
Worth Police Officers Association 23-24 (2017) (on file with author) (giving the union an equal 
role in selecting the identity of hearing examiners, who act in a role equivalent to arbitrators, for 
the appeal of disciplinary actions). 
161 See Agreement Between State of Hawaii, City and County of Honolulu, County of Hawaii, 
County of Maui, County of Kauai and State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers Bargaining 
Unit 12, at 49-50 (2011) (on file with author) (providing for an alternate striking system empowering 
the union to remove names from the panel of potential arbitrators). 
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Jacksonville,162 Las Vegas,163 Memphis,164 Milwaukee,165 Minneapolis,166 and 
Oakland167 allow officers or their union representatives to have this sort of 
control over the identity of an arbitrator, as do smaller and medium-sized cities 
like Akron, Ohio,168 Boulder, Colorado,169 Canton, Ohio,170 Champaign, 
Illinois,171 and Fairbanks, Alaska.172 
Most of these departments fall into two different categories: First, a handful 
of agencies explicitly stipulate an acceptable panel of arbitrators in their union 
contract. For example, in Chicago, the Fraternal Order of Police and the City of 
Chicago have agreed on a panel of five stipulated arbitrators in the appendix to 
the police union contract.173 This means that, in cities like Chicago, the identity 
of appellate arbitrators is a topic of negotiation during collective bargaining—a 
topic where the union can exert a significant influence. 
Second, another group of agencies establish alternative striking 
procedures. For instance, in Corpus Christi, the union contract allows officers 
 
162 See Agreement Between the City of Jacksonville and the Fraternal Order of Police, Police 
Officers Through Sergeants 21 (2011) (on file with author) (requiring mutual agreement between 
union and city for the appointment of an arbitrator to a rotating list). 
163 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
& Las Vegas Police Protective Association 19 (2016) (on file with author) (establishing procedure 
for union to select two of five potential arbitrators, with two additional arbitrators selected by 
the city, and one selected by mutual agreement). 
164 See Agreement Between the Memphis Police Association and the City of Memphis, 
Tennessee 20 (2016) (on file with author) (establishing the alternate striking method for selecting 
an arbitrator, thereby giving union equal power as city). 
165 See Agreement Between City of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Police Association, Local #21, 
I.U.P.A., AFL-CIO 12 (2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter City of Milwaukee] (using alternate 
striking method for selecting arbitrator). 
166 See Labor Agreement Between the City of Minneapolis and the Police Officers’ 
Federation of Minneapolis, at app. H (2017) (on file with author) (establishing alternate striking 
methodology for selecting arbitrators). 
167 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oakland and Oakland Police Officers’ 
Association 36-37 (2015) (on file with author) (using an alternate striking system for selecting arbitrators). 
168 See Agreement Between the City of Akron and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #7, at 8 
(Nov. 15, 2016) (on file with author) (alternatively striking names from a panel of arbitrators). 
169 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between City of Boulder and Boulder Police Officers 
Association 13 (2016) (on file with author) (describing alternative strike methodology for selecting arbitrator). 
170 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Canton and Canton Police 
Patrolmen’s Association Local 98/I.U.P.A. AFL-CIO 8-9 (2015) (on file with author) (establishing 
a mutually agreed panel of arbitrator provided in union contract). 
171 See Agreement Between Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign Patrol and 
Sergeant 66 (2015) (on file with author) (providing for an alternative striking methodology and 
a confidential proceeding). 
172 See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Fairbanks and the Public Safety 
Employees Association, Fairbanks Police Department Chapter 11 (Dec. 23, 2011) (on file with 
author) (establishing an alternative striking methodology from pre-agreed list of arbitrators). 
173 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 84 app. Q (describing how the city and the police 
union have agreed on a panel of five arbitrators to be used in expedited arbitrations). 
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to appeal “any disciplinary action” to an arbitrator.174 To select this arbitrator, 
the Director of Human Resources requests seven arbitrators from the 
National Academy of Arbitrators, or other “qualified agencies.”175 Thereafter, 
the police officer facing discipline and the city alternatively strike names from 
this panel of seven arbitrators until one name remains.176 
In theory, these procedures for selecting the identity of an arbitrator 
somewhat mirror the procedures for selecting jurors in the American justice 
system. The voir dire process provides both the defense and the plaintiff or 
prosecution with a limited number of preemptory strikes, as well as an 
unlimited number of strikes for cause.177 Much like the procedure described 
above, a court will usually impanel the individuals that survive this striking 
process as the jury.178 If this procedure is effective at impaneling impartial 
jurors in the American justice system, why not use a similar procedure to 
select an arbitrator for an appellate proceeding? 
The potential problem with using such a procedure in internal 
disciplinary appeals is that it may incentivize arbitrators to consistently 
compromise on punishment to increase their probability of being selected in 
future cases. Unlike a juror in the American justice system, arbitrators are 
often repeat players.179 Arbitrators must frequently survive these selection 
procedures in order to obtain work in the future. An arbitrator that 
frequently sides with either police management or officers during appellate 
procedures may be unlikely to survive future selection proceedings.180 From 
an accountability perspective, this mindset can be highly problematic if it 
results in arbitrators feeling compelled to frequently reduce the termination 
of unfit officers to mere suspensions. 
C. De Novo Review 
The majority of communities—around seventy percent—vest arbitrators 
with significant review authority on appeal. That is, these jurisdictions 
effectively give arbitrators the power to re-review all relevant issues on appeal. 
This means that arbitration on appeal provides officers with an opportunity 
 
174 City of Corpus Christi, supra note 155, at 18. 
175 Id. at 19. 
176 Id. 
177 Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 848-
53 (2015) (providing an excellent, preliminary summary of the voir dire process). 
178 Id. 
179 See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (distinguishing between repeat players and one shotters). 
180 See Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, supra note 103, at 146 (evaluating whether an 
arbitrator’s past decisions influence whether or not he or she will be selected to preside over similar 
disciplinary appeals in the future). 
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to relitigate disciplinary matters with little deference to decisions made by 
police supervisors, city officials, or civilian review boards. This sort of 
extensive review is provided in large American cities like Anchorage,181 the 
District of Columbia,182 and Orlando,183 as well as smaller communities like 
Albany, New York,184 Danville, Illinois,185 and New Haven, Connecticut.186 
Thus, even if the internal affairs division of a police department has 
presented sufficient evidence to convince members of a civilian review board 
to suspend or terminate an officer for conduct inconsistent with departmental 
regulations, many jurisdictions provide this officer with an opportunity to 
circumvent the decision by the civilian review board entirely and relitigate 
the matter anew before an arbitrator. For example, in New Haven, the police 
union contract permits officers to appeal disciplinary action to an arbitrator, 
who is tasked with the responsibility of conducting a “de novo hearing” in 
order to determine “whether said discharge or discipline was for just cause” 
as required by the contract.187 The contract further clarifies that an arbitrator 
is “empowered to receive evidence of alleged misconduct by the employee 
involved, as well as any defense, denial, or other evidence controverting or 
concerning such allegation . . . .”188 
 
181 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Anchorage Police Department Employees and 
Municipality of Anchorage 10-12, 16 (2015) (on file with author) (stating that management may 
punish officers for just cause, and then giving arbitrator wide latitude to review any apparent 
violation of the collective bargaining agreement on appeal). 
182 Labor Agreement Between the Government of the District of Columbia Metropolitan 
Police Department and the Fraternal Order of Police MPD Labor Committee, 11 (stating that 
employees may appeal adverse action, defined as a fine, suspension, demotion, or termination, to 
arbitration; further explaining that, during this arbitration, while the arbitrator should rely on the 
record from the hearing below, the arbitrator may re-review any evidentiary ruling, or other evidence 
improperly excluded from the earlier proceeding). 
183 Agreement Between City of Orlando and Orlando Lodge #25, Fraternal Order of Police, 
Inc. 2, 18-21 (2016) (on file with author) (stating that all discharges and punishments must be for 
just cause, and further providing an arbitrator on appeal with the power to provide any remedy 
necessary using a wide range of evidence). 
184 Agreement Between the City of Albany, New York and the Albany Police Officers Union 
Local 2841, Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Patrol Unit, at 11 
(2008) (on file with author) (stating that an arbitrator on appeal has the power to re-adjudicate guilt 
or innocence and can redecide this factual question based on a preponderance of evidence standard, 
with the burden on the employer). 
185 An Agreement By and Between City of Danville, Illinois and Policemen’s Benevolent and 
Protective Association, Unit #11, at 6, 8-9 (2015) (on file with author) (limiting management to only 
punishing officers for just cause and giving arbitrator the power on appeal to re-adjudicate whether 
just cause existed for punishment through the grievance process). 
186 Agreement Between the City of New Haven and the New Haven Police Union Local 530, 
and Council 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 4 (2011) (on file with author) (providing for de novo review 




578 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 545 
This stands in stark contrast to the limited role of appeals in the American 
criminal and civil justice system. As Professor Martin B. Louis observed, “[i]n 
America, appellate courts almost never decide cases de novo.”189 While 
American appellate courts generally have the authority to re-review legal 
determinations made at the trial level, appellate courts will typically defer to 
factual determinations made at the trial level.190 Thus, the “primary function” 
of appellate courts is to review for legal errors made at the trial level.191 Factual 
determinations are not always outside of the review authority of appellate 
courts. But appellate courts regularly adopt deferential standards when 
reviewing pure factual determinations made by a trial judge or jury.192 
This is not to say that appeals of disciplinary actions ought to mirror 
appeals in our justice system. In adjudicating disciplinary actions, most police 
departments do not employ procedures as rigorous as the Constitution 
demands in both civil and criminal trials. And rarely do these disciplinary 
hearings employ something akin to a civil or criminal jury as a decision-
maker. Thus, police officers may argue that de novo review on appeal provides 
an important check on unfair, arbitrary, or capricious punishments. 
Nevertheless, an expansive or de novo standard of review on appeal may 
insulate officers from democratic accountability. It diminishes the ability of 
police supervisors, city officials, and civilian review boards to reform police 
departments. Such an expansive standard of review on appeal means that 
most officers will be highly incentivized to appeal any disciplinary sanction 
to arbitration. And given that most jurisdictions make the arbitrator’s 
determination binding on all parties, it is the final word on certain classes 
of disciplinary action. This effectively means that any earlier disciplinary 
action taken against a police officer by a city official, police supervisor, or 
civilian review board is somewhat symbolic. Significant power sits with the 
arbitrator on appeal. 
 
189 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and 
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 
64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993 (1986). 
190 Admittedly, “[t]hese nicely compartmentalized separations of law from fact and trial level 
functions from appellate functions belie more complex distinctions . . . .” So-called “[u]ltimate 
facts,” where a trial court applies “historical facts found” at trial to “relevant general legal principles” 
combine law and fact and do not fit nicely into this dichotomy. Id. at 994. 
191 Id. at 993. 
192 Id. at 995; see also Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: 
A Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 72 (1944) (“Determinations of administrative 
bodies, judges, and juries on the ‘facts’ are treated by reviewing courts with considerable, though 
varying, degrees of, respect.”). 
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D. Effects of Procedure on Outcomes of Disciplinary Appeals 
Combined, it appears that a large majority of American police 
departments provide officers with similar procedural protections during 
disciplinary appeals. When layered on top of one another, these procedural 
protections may combine to frustrate democratic accountability efforts. 
Even so, it is important to recognize the limitations of these findings. This 
Article cannot definitively claim to show that these procedural protections 
help officers avoid punishment. 
Despite this empirical limitation, there is a growing body of evidence 
to suggest that the disciplinary appeals process described in this Article 
may frequently impede police accountability. As discussed briefly in Part 
II, Kelly, Lowery, and Rich at the Washington Post have conducted the most 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of disciplinary appeals on 
officer termination and rehiring practices.193 Recall that these reporters 
acquired data on the number of officers rehired on appeal after 
termination for misconduct across thirty-seven large American law 
enforcement agencies.194 They found that 451 of the 1,881 police officers 
fired by these agencies between 2006 and 2017 were ultimately ordered 
rehired on appeal, normally by arbitrators.195 Table 3 reproduces the data 
from the Washington Post study, showing the number of total officers fired 




193 Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, supra note 1. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 One immediate question that emerges from an analysis of the Washington Post data is 
whether the type of appellate procedures given to officers predicts the frequency of officers being 
rehired on appeal. A preliminary examination suggests there is no correlation between these two 
phenomena. This does not, however, suggest that the types of procedures offered to an officer on 
appeal have no effect on appellate outcomes. 
For one thing, we should not assume that police supervisors, civilian review boards, and other 
initial adjudicators of police discipline exercise their authority evenly across all jurisdictions. It may 
be that some police departments routinely seek excessive or unjustifiable punishment against officers 
in cases of alleged misconduct. In such cases, we would want officers to receive frequent relief on 
appeal. So for example, the fact that 70.45% of terminated police officers in San Antonio are rehired 
on appeal may be the result of the procedures used on appeal, or it may be because the City of San 
Antonio has a history of excessively seeking officer terminations when a lesser punishment is more 
justifiable. There is simply no way to know from the available data. 
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Table 3: Frequency of Disciplinary Appeals Resulting in the Rehiring of 









Atlanta Police Department 87 7 8.05% 
Austin Police Department 30 4 13.33% 
Boston Police Department 14 4 28.57% 
Broward County, FL Sheriff ’s Office 64 13 20.31% 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department 22 7 31.82% 
Chicago Police Department 103 10 9.71% 
Columbus Division of Police 23 2 8.70% 
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 86 39 45.35% 
Dallas Police Department 120 32 26.67% 
Denver Police Department 31 21 67.74% 
Detroit Police Department 37 5 13.51% 
Fort Worth Police Department 53 6 11.32% 
Harris County, TX Sheriff ’s Office 143 29 20.28% 
Honolulu Police Department 33 19 57.58% 
Houston Police Department 107 24 22.4% 
Jacksonville, FL Sheriff ’s Office 64 2 3.13% 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 59 14 23.73% 
Memphis Police Department 84 22 26.19% 
Metropolitan Nashville Police 
Department 
44 14 31.82% 
Miami Police Department 28 8 28.57% 
Miami-Dade Police Department 101 38 37.62% 
Milwaukee Police Department 57 11 19.30% 
Oklahoma City Police Department 15 6 40.00% 
Orange County, CA Sheriff ’s Department 43 6 13.95% 
Orange County, FL Sheriff ’s Office 28 0 0.00% 
Palm Beach, FL County Sheriff ’s Office 31 1 3.23% 
Philadelphia Police Department 71 44 61.97% 
Phoenix Police Department 37 15 40.54% 
Prince George’s County, MD Police 
Department 
58 1 1.72% 
Riverside County, CA Sheriff ’s Department 109 7 6.42% 
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Sacramento County, CA Sheriff ’s 
Department 
3 0 0.00% 
San Antonio Police Department 44 31 70.45% 
San Francisco Police Department 11 0 0.00% 
Santa Clara County, CA Sheriff ’s 
Department 
8 0 0.00% 
Seattle Police Department 19 4 21.05% 
Suffolk County, NY Police Department 9 4 44.44% 
 
This data provides valuable insight into the outcomes of disciplinary 
appeals. It suggests that the disciplinary appeals process as currently 
constructed results in the reduction or reversal of disciplinary sanctions in a 
large number of police departments. Just under a quarter (twenty-four 
percent) of all officers terminated for misconduct in large American police 
departments are eventually rehired because of the disciplinary appeals 
process. This analysis, though, only focuses on the rehiring of terminated 
officers. While only around ten percent of terminated Chicago police officers 
were ordered rehired on appeal according to the data obtained by the 
Washington Post, a separate analysis by Jennifer Smith Richards of the Chicago 
Tribune and Jodi S. Cohen of ProPublica found that, between 2010 and 2017, 
the City of Chicago has reduced or reversed sanctions against eighty-five 
percent of all police officers during the grievance appeals process.197 So, if 
anything, the Washington Post data likely underrepresents the number of 
officers that receive some sort of relief during disciplinary appeals. 
This raises a difficult normative question. How often should we expect 
police disciplinary decisions to be overturned or reduced on appeal? There is no 
easy answer to this question. Theoretically, appellate success ought to vary by 
department. In police departments that are prone to arbitrary, excessive, or 
unreasonable disciplinary decisions, we may want arbitrators to overturn or 
reduce disciplinary decisions frequently. As a normative matter though, it seems 
independently problematic if the appeals process results in the systematic 
overturning of just decisions made by democratically accountable actors. 
Unfortunately, this Article cannot prove that these procedural protections 
cause an unreasonable number of police disciplinary cases to be overturned 
or reduced on appeal. The narrow focus of this Article can only claim to build 
a descriptive account of the procedural process utilized during disciplinary 
appeals in a large cross section of American police departments. In doing so, 
 
197 Jennifer Smith Richards & Jodi S. Cohen, Cop Disciplinary System Undercut, CHI. 
TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2017), http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?
guid=bc73d166-b1f0-4d8b-9ff9-0529bad5bd7a [https://perma.cc/G2YH-L7N3]. 
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it shows that American police departments provide officers with a remarkably 
consistent package of procedural protections during disciplinary appeals. The 
findings from this study are certainly consistent with the hypothesis that the 
procedures used during disciplinary appeals may contribute to the high rate 
of reversals or reductions in punishments. Nevertheless, more research is 
needed to confirm this hypothesis.198 
E. Implications for Police Reform Efforts 
The findings from this Article have significant implications for the study 
of police reform. First, these findings suggest that arbitrators wield even more 
authority in internal disciplinary matters than many policing scholars have 
previously recognized. In fact, arbitrators are the true adjudicators of internal 
discipline in many police departments in this Article’s dataset—even in 
agencies that employ civilian review apparatuses designed to increase public 
participation in police disciplinary matters. A recent study by Udi Ofer found 
that twenty-four of the nation’s largest fifty police departments use civilian 
review boards to oversee certain police disciplinary matters.199 Commentators 
like Ofer generally point to civilian review boards as examples of communities 
empowering the public with meaningful oversight of police conduct. 
The findings from this Article suggest that some civilian review boards—even 
robust ones with full investigative, subpoena, and disciplinary authority—may be 
somewhat symbolic in their functional importance. Ofer’s study identifies Detroit 
 
198 As a preliminary matter, it may be useful to consider the frequency that litigants receive 
relief on appeal in the court system. One study published in 2015 found that, of the 69,348 estimated 
criminal appeals in state court, around 8,226 (11.9%) were reversed, remanded, or modified. NICOLE 
WATERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN STATE COURTS 1 (2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf [https://perma.cc/C76P-MQKT]. Thus, it seems safe 
to say that police officers may more frequently receive relief than other litigants in the American 
justice system, despite not being nearly as limited by the exclusionary rule, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, and other procedural hurdles that can contribute to reversals in the federal system. More 
research is needed on this point. 
199 Ofer, supra note 38, at 1041-43. Ofer also provides an excellent discussion of the history of 
civilian review boards and makes some important normative recommendations on how communities 
could improve the structure of civilian review boards to ensure long-term stability and independence. 
As Ofer explains, Washington, D.C. and New York were two of the earliest adopters of civilian 
reviews, establishing some sort of civilian oversight boards in 1948 and 1953, respectively. In both 
cases, though, city officials eventually dismantled these early civilian review boards after “intense 
lobbying” by police unions. The concept of civilian oversight of police departments would not go 
mainstream until the 1960s and 1970s, when highly publicized incidents of police brutality, combined 
with the civil rights movement, led to more widespread implementation of civilian oversight 
structures. Id. at 1040-41; see also Samuel Walker, The History of the Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN 
OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1, 8 (Justina Cintron Perino ed., 2006) (“What 
brought about this profound change in public attitudes? There have been no academic studies of this 
question, but the evidence suggests a broad change in public attitudes toward official misconduct.”). 
Today, there are over 100 civilian review boards across the country. Ofer, supra note 38, at 1041. 
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as a community with one of the nation’s most unique and powerful civilian review 
boards, referred to as the Detroit Police Commission, compromised of seven 
members elected from each police district and four members selected by the 
Mayor with the approval of the City Council.200 The Detroit Police Commission 
has the authority to subpoena information during investigations201 and the ability 
to discipline officers.202 Detroit is one of a few large cities in the United States 
that gives a civilian review board such extensive authority, matched by Chicago, 
Milwaukee, Newark, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.203 It would seem that 
Detroit is a model of civilian control over police disciplinary investigations. 
And yet, Detroit’s union contract establishes an appeals process that, in 
some cases, allows arbitrators on appeal to overrule decisions made by the 
Detroit Police Commission.204 The police union has a significant role in 
selecting the identity of this third-party arbitrator.205 The arbitrator’s 
decision is final and binding on all parties.206 And based on the terms of the 
union contract, it appears that this arbitrator has de novo authority to re-
examine whether just cause existed for the punishment.207 So while the 
Detroit Police Commission seems to make civilians the primary adjudicators 
of internal discipline for police officers, this is an illusion. The ultimate power 
resides with an appellate arbitrator.208 And Detroit is not unique. This same 
 
200 Ofer, supra note 38, at 1055 app. 
201 See id. at 1043 (“[T]he only review board that has a leadership structure that is not majority 
nominated by the mayor and that is empowered with subpoena, disciplinary, and policy review 
authorities, is Detroit’s.”). 
202 See id. (“[S]ome form of disciplinary authority remains relatively rare, with only six civilian 
review boards having it—Chicago, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Newark.”). 
203 See id. at 1053-62 (showing that all of these cities have the authority described above). 
204 See City of Detroit, supra note 158, at 11-16, (establishing the right of the department to 
punish only for just cause; providing details on the disciplinary process; further describing the 
appellate process, including expedited arbitration for suspensions of more than three days in length). 
205 See id. at 11-12 (permitting two methods for selecting an arbitrator: an existing panel of 
acceptable arbitrators, or an alternative striking system whereby the union gets a say in the identity 
of the arbitrator as the city management). 
206 See id. at 13 (stating that the arbitrator’s decision “shall be final and binding on the 
Association, on all bargaining unit members, and on the Department”). 
207 Id. at 11-13 (appearing to provide the arbitrator with the general authority to determine if 
any disciplinary action violates the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which requires just 
cause, and seemingly giving the arbitrator wide authority to hear evidence from both sides with little 
deference to any decisions made by the Police Commission). 
208 To elaborate further, this finding may even suggest that, in most American police 
departments, up-front disciplinary mechanisms like civilian review boards act more akin to internal 
prosecutors. They can bring charges against police officers for misconduct, but the final authority 
on disciplinary actions generally rests with third-party arbitrators. If true, this would upend the 
traditional narrative of police reform articulated by many scholars, which emphasizes the importance 
of departmental leadership dedicated to constitutional policing. Further, if we hope to promote 
constitutional policing, police departments need leadership within a police department that 
rigorously investigates and responds to alleged officer wrongdoing. But this, in itself, will often be 
 
584 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 545 
general pattern holds in other large American cities with seemingly robust 
civilian review boards, like Chicago209 and Milwaukee.210 
Second, if police disciplinary appeals frequently lead to arbitrators 
overturning termination decisions, this has worrisome downstream effects 
for police reform efforts, in part because of the U.S. Supreme Court holding 
in Brady v. Maryland.211 There, the Court held that prosecutors must disclose 
material evidence that is favorable to the defense, including anything known 
to any member of the prosecution team.212 As Jonathan Abel has described 
in detail, evidence of prior misconduct by police officers can be critical pieces 
of Brady material.213 This is particularly true when the evidence of 
misconduct suggests that the officer has a history of dishonesty,214 theft,215 
false police reports,216 or other wrongdoing that calls into question the 
officer’s credibility as a witness. This has forced some police departments to 
develop Brady lists—databases of officers who have previously committed 
acts of misconduct that must be disclosed to defense counsel in criminal 
cases to avoid violating the Brady decision.217 Officers placed on such Brady 
lists generally “cannot make arrests, investigate cases, or conduct any other 
police work that might lead to the witness stand,” because if they do, the 
defense counsel will have access to records of the officer’s prior misconduct 
 
insufficient. Supervisors within a police department must then navigate a complex disciplinary 
appeals process that is structured to insulate officers from public accountability. 
209 See City of Chicago, supra note 69, at 17-18, 84-85 (laying out the ground rules of 
arbitrations of appeals of disciplinary suspensions, including a designated panel of arbitrators 
selected via the collective bargaining process, making the arbitration procedure “final and binding,” 
and seemingly granting the arbitrator wide authority). 
210 See City of Milwaukee, supra note 165, at 7-14 (describing the appellate procedure for some 
types of disciplinary matters, which includes “final and binding arbitration” of disciplinary actions, 
grants the Association significant authority to select the arbitrator, and gives the arbitrator wide, 
seemingly de novo authority). 
211 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
212 Id. at 87-88; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (further clarifying Brady 
to make clear that evidence known to the prosecution team must be disclosed). 
213 Abel, supra note 41, at 745-47. 
214 See Fields v. State, 69 A.3d 1104, 1110 (Md. 2013) (examining two detectives accused of 
deceiving law enforcement supervisors by “submitting fraudulent, daily and court overtime slips”). 
215 See United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 2010) (involving police officers 
using “buy money” for personal purchases). 
216 See Miller v. City of Ithaca, 914 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing a police officer 
under investigation for falsifying details of vehicle stops in his reports). 
217 Abel, supra note 41, at 780. Additionally, as Professor Rachel Moran has observed, these 
Brady lists may only exist in some (perhaps even a minority) of police departments. In other 
jurisdictions with laws protecting the confidentiality of police records, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys may be unable to get access to these records. See generally Rachel Moran, Contesting Police 
Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339 (2018) (discussing the legal barriers that exist to accessing 
evidence regarding a police officer’s credibility, particularly in contrast to comparable evidence 
regarding a defendant). 
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for impeachment purposes.218 Abel states that such officers “would be well 
advised to start looking for a new profession,” because they can no longer 
perform the basic functions of a law enforcement officer.219 
But the findings from this Article present a different, and especially 
problematic, possibility. Because of the disciplinary appeals process, many 
police departments may be unable to terminate the employment of these so-
called “Brady cops.”220 Instead, departments may be forced to utilize limited 
resources employing a police officer who cannot engage in any policing 
function that may lead to testimony before a court.221 To accomplish this, 
many police departments have shuffled staff and reassigned rehired officers, 
so as to minimize their involvement in criminal cases.222 This can drive up 
the cost of public safety services, not to mention limit the ability of a police 
chief to bring about real reform within an agency. 
Third, this Article’s findings bolster the hypothesis that police union 
contract negotiations may be susceptible to regulatory capture. In the past, I 
have observed that police union contract negotiations often happen outside 
of public view.223 Police unions are powerful political constituencies.224 Some 
communities have little in the way of resources to satisfy union demands for 
higher salaries and more generous benefits.225 And virtually all municipalities 
 
218 Abel, supra note 41, at 746. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 785-86. 
221 See id. at 785 (“This can create a difficult situation for police management, which may find 
itself stuck with an officer who cannot testify because the prosecutor does not trust her, but who also 
cannot be terminated because the officer fought off her termination through arbitration.”). 
222 See, e.g., Pauline Repard, The Secret List That Police Officers Don’t Want You to See, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/public-safety/
sd-me-brady-notebook-20170823-story.html [https://perma.cc/38ZR-TTRU] (describing the use of 
Brady lists for officers still on the force in San Diego after serious incidents of misconduct); see also 
Craig Cheatham, Dan Monk, Joe Rosemeyer, & Brian Niesz, Can Police Officers Still Serve After 
They’re Caught Being Dishonest?, WCPO CINCINNATI (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.wcpo.com/
longform/i-team-investigation-can-officers-still-serve-after-theyre-caught-being-dishonest 
[https://perma.cc/B2M2-6BK6] (providing data on the number of officers serving in 
Cincinnati after apparent dishonesty). 
223 See Rushin, supra note 30, at 1213 (“[T]here are thousands of decentralized police 
departments in the United States, and each negotiates its own collective bargaining agreements, 
largely outside public view.”). 
224 See, e.g., Lee Fang, Maryland Cop Lobbyists Helped Block Reforms Just Last Month, INTERCEPT 
(Apr. 28, 2015, 9:42 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/04/28/baltimore-freddie-gray-prosecute 
[https://perma.cc/DKU9-FZLV] (detailing how police unions effectively blocked various reforms in 
Maryland); see also Michael Tracey, The Police Lobby Has Far Too Much Power in American Politics, 
VICE (Dec. 4, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nnqyeg/the-pernicious-power-
of-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5BDZ-3DZG] (describing the political power of police unions). 
225 See John Chase & David Heinzmann, Cops Traded Away Pay for Protection in Police 
Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016, 8:36 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-chicago-police-contracts-fop-20160520-story.html [https://perma.cc/5ZLK-ZP6U] 
(describing how, in Chicago, the city traded off lower salaries for more generous disciplinary protections). 
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negotiate salaries, benefits, and disciplinary procedures as part of the same 
private negotiation.226 Under these conditions, I have hypothesized that 
municipal leaders may be incentivized to offer concessions to police unions 
on disciplinary procedures in exchange for lower officer salaries.227 A number 
of anecdotal cases suggest that such tradeoffs are commonplace.228 This 
Article provides further evidence that collective bargaining agreements can 
serve as a barrier to officer accountability—this time through the elaboration 
of extensive appellate protections for officers found guilty of misconduct. 
Fourth, these findings have important implications for the literature on 
police officer decertification. Professor Roger Goldman has argued that “states 
can deter police misconduct by decertification of the officer, that is, by revoking 
the officer’s state certification for constitutional violations in evidence 
gathering.”229 All states other than Hawaii have some type of state-wide agency, 
typically known as a Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission 
(POST), that can hold hearings and sanction officers engaged in sufficiently 
serious misconduct, as defined by the requisite state statute.230 And the vast 
majority of state POSTs have the statutory authority to not only sanction 
officers but actually strip them of their legal ability to work as police officers in 
the state.231 This process, referred to by various names including 
decertification, cancellation, or revocation may be “the most common state 
legislative and administrative approach for addressing police misconduct” even 
if it is “largely unknown to scholars and the public.”232 
The story surrounding the death of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice illustrates 
the importance of this police accountability mechanism. Immediately after 
the killing, Cleveland officials learned that the officer involved “hid the fact 
that he had an ‘emotional breakdown’ during the state qualification course, 
and that his former employer” terminated his employment after concluding 
 
226 See Rushin, supra note 30, at 1245 (“As currently structured, most municipalities negotiate 
with police unions about disciplinary procedures alongside salaries, benefits, vacation time, 
promotion procedures, and more.”). 
227 Id. at 1245-46. 
228 See, e.g., Chase & Heinzmann, supra note 225. 
229 Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional 
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 45, 47 (1987); see also Roger Goldman, A 
Model Decertification Law, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 147 (2012) (offering a model law for 
regulating police decertification). 
230 Legislators Seek More Law Enforcement Oversight, HAW. NEWS NOW (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/31193633/hawaii-only-state-in-the-country-with-no-law-enforcement-
standards-board [https://perma.cc/MV4X-3Z3T]. 
231 See Goldman & Puro, supra note 50, at 542 (explaining that at least forty-three states have 
the power to revoke officer certification). 
232 Id. at 542-43. 
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that “he was unable ‘to emotionally function.’”233 The officer’s failure to 
disclose his previous firing gave Cleveland officials grounds to terminate his 
employment.234 But the officer ultimately did not face criminal penalties.235 
Under Ohio state law, an officer can only face decertification for a felony 
conviction or a felony that is pleaded down to a misdemeanor.236 As a result, 
the officer maintained his license to work as a police officer in Ohio and was 
hired by another police department in October of 2018.237 This incident 
illustrates that decertification is only effective if POSTs are legislatively 
empowered to decertify officers aggressively when their behavior 
demonstrates their lack of fitness to serve as a law enforcement officer. 
This realization raises several important questions regarding police 
disciplinary appeals and decertification that have received insufficient attention 
in the existing literature. If an arbitrator overturns or reduces a penalty against 
an officer found responsible for serious misconduct, can a POST still decertify 
that officer? Or do the police disciplinary appeals effectively insulate officers 
from legislatively enacted decertification procedures? It appears that state 
POSTs have taken different positions on this issue.238 
If outside arbitrators frequently order the rehiring of problematic officers, 
a state may need to consider whether its POST should nonetheless be 
statutorily authorized to conduct decertification hearings to protect the 
public from an individual that may nonetheless be unfit to carry out the duties 
of a sworn peace officer. 
 
233 Safia Samee Ali, Fired Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice Could Be Back at Another Department, 





237 Matthew Haag, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Is Hired by an Ohio Police Department, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/timothy-loehmann-tamir-rice-shooting.html. 
238 Some state POSTs, like Washington, cannot decertify an officer if an arbitrator on appeal 
reverses the officer’s termination. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.105(d) (2012) (providing that 
officer discharge can be the basis for a decertification, but only if the discharge is finalized). POSTs 
in other states, like Arizona, maintain the ability to decertify officers even if a disciplinary penalty 
is overturned on appeal. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1822(C)(1) (2001) (describing how the 
state agency may conduct an independent investigation that may result in decertification based on 
any complaint it receives). For more information on the variation in state decertification policies, see 
RAYMOND A. FRANKLIN, POLICE OFFICER CERTIFICATION REVOCATION INFO. SHARING: NAT’L 
PUB. SAFETY OFFICER DECERTIFICATION DATABASE, 2005 SURVEY OF POST AGENCIES 
REGARDING CERTIFICATION PRACTICES (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/grants/213048.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J9NA-EPGY]. 
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V. REFORMING POLICE DISCIPLINARY APPEALS 
Police need basic procedural protections against arbitrary and capricious 
punishment. This includes the ability to appeal disciplinary action. At the 
same time, these appellate procedures should not allow officers to circumvent 
democratic oversight or otherwise thwart reasonable accountability efforts. 
This Article shows that virtually all police departments give officers multiple 
layers of appellate review, often culminating in binding arbitration. In most 
cases, the police union has some substantial role in selecting the identity of 
the arbitrator. And in most of these cases, the arbitrator is given expansive 
authority to relitigate all decisions made by police supervisors, city officials, 
and civilian review boards. 
While each of these appellate procedures may be individually defensible, 
they could theoretically combine to create a formidable barrier to 
accountability. These procedural protections may be problematic to the extent 
that they limit the ability of supervisors to punish or terminate problematic 
officers responsible for serious misconduct. Additionally, these protections 
may be troubling because they limit the role of the public in overseeing local 
law enforcement. Prior scholars have argued that “democratic deliberation 
around policing is an imperative,” as it ensures that officers are accountable 
to the people they serve.239 
Thus, this Part considers how the states and localities could reform the 
disciplinary appeals process in American police departments in a manner that 
balances officers’ need for procedural protections against arbitrary punishment 
with a community’s need for democratic oversight and accountability. 
A. Democratizing Disciplinary Appeals 
In my previous work, I have defended the importance of democratic 
participation and transparency in the development of internal disciplinary 
procedures in police departments.240 I am hardly the first to make such a 
claim. Prior studies have found that, without substantial democratic 
participation in the development of police policies, departments can become 
insular and unresponsive to community needs.241 
 
239 Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1837, 
1907 (2015). Professors Friedman and Ponomarenko found that democratic accountability is 
generally lacking, often without sufficient justification in the world of policing. Id. at 1843-45. 
240 See generally Rushin, supra note 30 (arguing in favor of more public involvement in the 
development of police union contracts in hopes of preventing regulatory capture). 
241 See, e.g., Christopher E. Stone & Heather Ward, Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action, 
10 POLICING & SOC’Y 11, 12 (2000) (posing the question, “How can police agencies create internal 
discipline necessary to advance public safety while treating people with respect?” and stating that 
this “question is as old as democratic theory”). 
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Scholars often disagree about the extent to which policing ought to be 
responsive to democratic pressures, particularly in the adjudication of 
disciplinary cases. For example, Professor Christopher E. Stone and Heather 
Ward have shown how policing advocates have widely varying opinions about 
where best to situate police disciplinary authority.242 Police chiefs may argue 
that officer disciplinary decisions ought to rest in their hands alone, in order 
to ensure a “straight, hierarchical line” of accountability within a police 
department.243 Critics of such an alignment may point out that, while police 
chiefs are normally subject to firing by democratically accountable actors like 
mayors or city councils, this doesn’t always work in practice.244 As a result, 
some policing experts support more direct forms of democratic accountability 
in police disciplinary matter, like civilian review boards that better 
incorporate the opinions of generally unrepresented minorities.245 
Regardless of where experts fall in this debate,246 there is nearly uniform 
agreement that the development of police policies and officer oversight 
should not be divorced from community input.247 This Article does not tackle 
the larger question of how communities ought to balance the need for 
democratic oversight and due process in the adjudication of internal 
disciplinary matters. Instead, it makes a narrower observation. The data 
presented in this Article suggests that the disciplinary appeals process in 
many departments is largely devoid of democratic participation. 
If communities want to modestly reform the existing disciplinary appeals 
process so as to better facilitate democratic accountability, there are several 
ways they could do this. One of the most effective, and likely controversial, 
ways that communities could accomplish this is by entirely eliminating 
arbitration of disciplinary appeals. In its place, communities could vest 
 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 17. 
244 See id. (citing the Los Angeles Police Department as an example). 
245 Id. at 17-18. 
246 In fact, as Stone and Ward point out, most experts do not believe that we must choose 
one model of democratic oversight or another. This need not be a “Hobson’s choice.” Instead we 
generally recognize that “police in a democracy must be accountable simultaneously to multiple 
levels of control.” Id. at 13. 
247 Admittedly, there is disagreement between scholars on how democratic accountability 
ought to work in police departments, even if there is some uniformity in the belief that democratic 
accountability is an important value in police oversight generally. See, e.g., Friedman and 
Ponomarenko, supra note 239 (arguing generally for the value of democratic accountability in 
policing); Rushin, supra note 30 (supporting additional democratic involvement in the development 
of disciplinary procedures); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police 
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2010) (arguing for 
better democratic incorporation of stakeholder interests in police reform efforts); David A. Sklansky, 
Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (discussing the complex relationship between 
police, criminal procedural, and democratic theory). 
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appellate review authority in more democratically accountable actors, like city 
councils, mayors, city managers, or civilian review boards. A number of 
communities already do this, like Fountain Valley, California248 or Lincoln, 
Nebraska.249 This may allow internal disciplinary responses by local police 
departments to reflect community values more accurately. 
As an alternative, communities could make appellate arbitrations 
advisory, or at least provide an opportunity for city leaders to overturn 
particularly egregious decisions by arbitrators. Some cities provide such 
procedures on appeal. These include Peoria, Arizona,250 as well as many cities 
in California, including Buena Park,251 Burbank,252 Cathedral City,253 Costa 
Mesa,254 Delano,255 Fullerton,256 Indio,257 Ontario,258 Oxnard,259 and 
 
248 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Fountain Valley and the Fountain 
Valley Police Officers’ Association 36-37 (2014) (on file with author) (providing officers the right to 
appeal disciplinary action to the police chief and then the city manager, and providing a limited 
option under municipal code for officers to challenge the city manager’s final decision to city council 
under certain exceptional circumstances). 
249 See Agreement Between Lincoln Police Union and the City of Lincoln, Nebraska 16-17 
(2016) (on file with author) (permitting appeal to city’s Personnel Board). 
250 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Peoria and Peoria Police Officers 
Association, Covering Police Officers Unit 23-24 (2013) (on file with author) (providing officers the chance 
to bring a disciplinary grievance before an arbitrator as the third step in the grievance process, but then 
allowing the police department to appeal an arbitrator’s grievance to the City Manager at step four). 
251 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Buena Park, California and the 
Buena Park Police Association 39-41, 57-59 (2016) (on file with author) (stipulating that arbitration 
on appeal is merely advisory). 
252 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Burbank and the Burbank Police 
Officers’ Association 54-61 (2016) (on file with author) (establishing procedures for arbitration of 
disciplinary appeals and providing that “[t]he decision of the arbitrator shall be solely advisory in nature”). 
253 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Cathedral City and Cathedral City 
Police Officer’s Association (CCPOA) 16-20 (2016) (on file with author) (explaining the procedures 
for hearing officers to consider appeals by officers to disciplinary action, but stating explicitly that 
the hearing officer’s decision is not binding; instead the “City Manager or designee mutually 
agreeable to the City Manager and the employee shall review the Hearing Officer’s 
recommendation, but shall not be bound thereby”). 
254 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Representatives of the Costa Mesa Police 
Association and the City of Costa Mesa 17-24 (2014) (on file with author) (establishing arbitration 
procedures but vesting final decision-making authority with the Chief Executive Officer). 
255 See Agreement Between City of Delano and Delano Police Officers Association 6-8 (2017) 
(on file with author) (authorizing advisory arbitration of disciplinary action). 
256 See City of Fullerton, supra note 46, at 44 (placing the authority to review an arbitrator’s 
decision in the hands of the city council). 
257 See City of Indio, supra note 152, at 42-46 (allowing appellate arbitration but vesting final 
authority in hands of city manager). 
258 See Memorandum of Understanding Between Ontario Police Officers Association and City 
of Ontario 30 (2014) (on file with author) (making arbitration awards subject to review by city council). 
259 See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oxnard and Oxnard Peace Officers’ 
Association 22 (2016) (on file with author) (permitting advisory arbitration). 
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Pasadena.260 Officers may find this option more procedurally just, as it would 
give them an opportunity to make their case before a third party that is 
separate from city leadership. And city leaders would maintain the flexibility 
to depart from decisions made by an arbitrator when it appears to run 
counter to the public’s interest. 
Or, if communities still want to use binding appellate arbitration in some 
disciplinary cases, they could nonetheless increase the amount of democratic 
accountability in this process by following the model of Oceanside, 
California. There, the city’s police union contract permits officers to appeal 
relatively minor disciplinary action to binding arbitration.261 But the contract 
makes arbitration decisions merely advisory for serious misconduct resulting 
in suspensions and terminations.262 Such a compromise would allow cities to 
maintain the use of arbitration so as to avoid unfair punishments in some 
cases, while maintaining the ability of city officials to protect the public 
interest in police accountability in cases of serious misconduct where the 
continued employment of the officer could pose a public safety risk. 
Each of these options would give the public a greater role in overseeing 
police disciplinary decisions and would give police and city leaders greater 
latitude to circumvent some of the harmful, downstream effects of disciplinary 
appeals procedures that currently insulate officers from punishment. 
B. Limiting the Scope of Appellate Review 
Police may understandably object to the proposals in the previous section 
that remove or diminish the power of arbitrators in hopes of enhancing 
democratic oversight of policing. Theoretically, arbitrators are neutral, third 
parties who should not be indebted to either party during an appellate 
procedure. This makes an arbitrator a natural choice to settle disputes 
between police unions and city leadership on appeal. Indeed, this Article does 
not take issue with the concept of arbitration. As I have already argued, many 
of the procedures described in this Article are individually defensible. 
Instead, it may be their combination that can create appellate procedures that 
systematically benefit officers at the expense of the community. 
Thus, an alternative way that communities could improve the 
disciplinary appeals process is by narrowing the scope of an arbitrator’s scope 
 
260 See Amended and Restated Memorandum of Understanding Between Pasadena Police 
Officers Association 41 (2017) (on file with author) (giving the Municipal Employee Relations 
Officer the authority to accept, modify, or reject hearing decision on appeal). 
261 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Oceanside and the Oceanside 
Police Officers’ Association 30-35 (2017) (on file with author) (stating that appeals of non-suspensions 
and non-terminations go to binding adjudication by “third party neutral,” but in other appeals, 
decisions by third party neutrals will be “advisory”). 
262 Id. 
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of review. As discussed in Section IV.D, most communities allow arbitrators 
to rehear cases effectively de novo. This means that they need not defer to 
any decisions made by civilian review boards, police leaders, or city 
leadership. Nevertheless, not all cities use this model. Some cities explicitly 
limit the authority of arbitration on appeal. 
For example, Fullerton, California permits advisory arbitration on appeal, 
but bars an arbitrator from overruling or modifying punishment handed 
down against an officer unless the arbitrator finds the punishment to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable.”263 This 
standard of review on appeal is far more favorable to city leaders than that 
used in a majority of the cities in this dataset. Fullerton’s standard of review 
is similar to that used by Bloomington, Illinois, which states that suspensions 
should “be upheld unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the 
needs of the service.”264 Eugene, Oregon similarly limits the authority of the 
arbitrator to review disciplinary matter de novo by only empowering them to 
determine whether the city’s actions were “reasonably consistent with City 
and departmental guidelines.”265 
Alternatively, communities could limit arbitrators from altering 
punishment in cases where the facts support a finding of guilt. This is the 
case in Grand Rapids, Michigan, where an arbitrator on appeal can overturn 
a decision made by the city, but cannot reduce punishment in cases where 
there is evidence to support the allegation of misconduct.266 Similarly, the 
policy in Ocala, Florida states that an arbitrator on appeal cannot question 
the city’s judgment on the proper amount of punishment, provided that the 
department has demonstrated “good cause for discipline.”267 
By enacting similar limitations on the scope of review on appeal, states 
and localities could maintain the use of arbitration while preventing these 
appellate procedures from entirely displacing the role of police leaders, city 
leaders, and civilian review boards. This would represent a positive step in 
promoting democratic accountability in the police disciplinary appeals. 
C. Possible Drawbacks 
Police officers and unions may object to the proposals discussed in this 
Article for several reasons. First, police officers and police unions may argue 
 
263 City of Fullerton, supra note 46, at 45. 
264 Agreement Between City of Bloomington, Illinois and Police Benevolent and Protective 
Association, Unit No. 21, at 15 (2014) (on file with author). 
265 Contract Between the City of Eugene and the Eugene Police Employees’ Association 45 
(2016) (on file with author). 
266 City of Grand Rapids, supra note 45, at 6. 
267 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Ocala, Florida and Florida State 
Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police 15 (2016) (on file with author). 
2019] Police Disciplinary Appeals 593 
that the proposals in this Article would give police officers fewer procedural 
protections during appeal than some other public servants. If civil servants 
like fire fighters or teachers have similar appellate protections from 
disciplinary action, why should we treat police officers differently? 
While understandable, this argument ignores the fact that police work is 
fundamentally different from the work of most public servants. As I have 
previously argued, “[u]nlike other public employees, police officers generally 
carry firearms, make investigatory stops, conduct arrests, and use lethal force 
when needed.”268 Officers also encounter “people when they are both most 
threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are 
frightened, when they are desperate, when they are drunk, when they are 
violent, or when they are ashamed.”269 We necessarily give police officers 
considerable discretion in carrying out their job. With this discretion, there 
is a heightened risk that officers will engage in misconduct. And unlike other 
fields, misconduct by police officers “can leave [a] victim dead or 
permanently damaged, and under the right circumstances one cop’s bad 
call—or a group of cops’ habitual [bad behavior]—can be the spark that 
leaves a city like Baltimore in flames.”270 Given these realities of modern 
American policing, it is critical to ensure that police disciplinary procedures 
reflect not just a respect for due process, but also a respect for the opinions 
of the public that the police department serves. 
Second, and relatedly, the removal or curtailing of arbitration provisions in 
police disciplinary appeals may result in significant pushback by frontline 
officers. Some officers may understandably argue that this would reduce job 
security and hurt officer morale, making police work less appealing. There is at 
least some empirical evidence to suggest that efforts to increase oversight and 
accountability among police officers can result in union opposition, reduced 
street-level enforcement of the law, and ultimately de-policing.271 While this is 
a serious concern, it should not deter communities from establishing a 
disciplinary appeals process that emphasizes democratic accountability. 
 
268 Rushin, supra note 30, at 1248. 
269 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
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270 Ross Douthat, Our Police Union Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-our-police-union-problem.html [https://perma.cc/MD53-3GZZ]. 
271 See, e.g., Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 758-59 
(2017) (finding that the introduction of federal intervention into American police departments to 
reduce patterns of misconduct was associated with a statistically significant uptick in property crime 
rates, and also noting that this uptick in crime was frontloaded in the years immediately after federal 
intervention). But cf. Joshua Chanin & Brittany Sheats, Depolicing as Dissent Shirking: Examining the 
Effects of Pattern or Practice Misconduct Reform on Police Behavior, 43 CRIM. JUST. REV. 105 (2019) (finding 
that federal intervention did not result in reductions in arrests across a sample of test agencies). 
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Virtually any policing regulation can inspire some pushback from frontline 
officers. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that such pushback and 
negative side effects are generally temporary in nature. Take, for example, the 
pushback from police officers during cases of federal intervention pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 14141.272 The Department of Justice (DOJ), mostly under 
Democratic presidents,273 has used this statute to force local police departments 
into negotiated settlements to address patterns of unconstitutional or unlawful 
misconduct.274 In many of these negotiated settlements, the DOJ has pressured 
police departments to improve disciplinary oversight of officers.275 In response, 
surveys have found that officers frequently complained about how these new 
disciplinary measures caused them to be less proactive “because of [the] fear of 
being unfairly disciplined.”276 
Yet, empirical research has found that this sort of pushback and reduction 
in morale did not have any long-term, statistically significant effect on arrest 
or crime rates.277 Additionally, even if reforming disciplinary appeals does 
 
272 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012). 
273 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) (attributing the weakness in the enforcement of § 14141 to lack of political 
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Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3232 fig. 3 (2014) (showing 
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274 See STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
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enforced § 14141 over time, listing the departments subject to DOJ reform since the statute’s passage 
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in problematic police departments). 
275 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 50, at 1378-87 (providing a summary of 
the various portions of these negotiated settlements, including regulations of use of force, early 
intervention and risk management systems, overhauls of complaint and investigation procedures, 
new training procedures, measures to address bias in policing, and programs emphasizing 
community policing). 
276 See, e.g, CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A 
CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 19-20 (2009), 
http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/V78Q-3JQL] 
(finding that eighty-nine percent of officers believed that “because of fear of being unfairly 
disciplined, many LAPD officers are not proactive in doing their jobs”). 
277 See Chanin & Sheats, supra note 271, at 117-18  (finding no effect of federal intervention on arrest 
rates); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 271, at 758-59 (finding that, if federal intervention did result in any 
de-policing effect, it was mostly in terms of property crime rates, and this effect was frontloaded).   
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have some negative effects on officer morale, this may be a necessary cost to 
ensure that police departments reflect the values of their constituents. 
Democratic accountability is an independently important goal in policing, as 
demonstrated by the widespread support for community policing initiatives, 
even if it “may sometimes require compromise.”278 
And third, some may argue that the disciplinary appeals process in American 
police departments is exhaustive and undemocratic out of necessity because of 
the arbitrary nature of earlier disciplinary proceedings. For example, Professor 
Kate Levine’s important new work describes the current state of internal 
discipline in American police departments as “uneven, arbitrary, and entirely 
discretionary.”279 As evidence for this proposition, Professor Levine compares 
the way that two different police departments—the Chicago Police Department 
and the Philadelphia Police Department—reacted to officers claiming to 
exercise their free speech rights while on duty.280 In Chicago, two black officers 
received reprimands for taking a photograph with a civilian while kneeling in 
support of Colin Kaepernick’s protest against police brutality.281 But in 
Philadelphia, a white officer received no such punishment or reprimand for 
displaying a tattoo of an eagle symbol allegedly used by the Nazi Party along 
with the word “Fatherland.”282 Professor Levine cites the seemingly inconsistent 
treatment of these officers across two major American police departments to 
demonstrate the unpredictability of modern police discipline. 
If we accept Professor Levine’s claim, then disciplinary appeals serve a 
critically important role. The appeals process may protect officers from being 
unfairly punished, particularly when unfair punishment is politically popular 
or expedient. Officers may worry that increasing public involvement in 
 
278 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 271, at 776. 
279 Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 842 (2018). 
280 See id. at 841-42 (summarizing these two vignettes and explaining that they “reflect the 
state of internal discipline in police departments across the country”). 
281 Tom Porter, Chicago Police Officers Disciplined for Taking a Knee in Solidarity with Colin 
Kaepernick, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2017, 5:25 AM GMT), http://www.newsweek.com/
chicago-police-officers-discplined-taking-knee-solidarity-colin-kaepernick-670988 [https://perma.cc/
U5N9-NUKW]. The punishment happened after a civilian posted a picture of the event on 
Instagram. The Chicago Police Spokesman stated that the department reprimanded the 
officers for violating the city’s policy on political speech while in uniform. 
282 John Kopp, Photos Surface of Philly Police Officer with Nazi Tattoo, PHILLY VOICE (Sept. 1, 2016), 
http://www.phillyvoice.com/photos-surface-philly-police-officer-nazi-tattoo [https://perma.cc/37UB-6FD5] 
(describing the public outrage to the tattoo and showing a picture of the officer “posing with fellow 
Nazi reenactors”); John Kopp, Internal Affairs Investigation Clears Philly Police Officer with Apparent Nazi 
Tattoo, PHILLY VOICE (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.phillyvoice.com/internal-affairs-investigation-
clears-philly-police-officer-apparent-nazi-tattoo [https://perma.cc/4KJT-SRDX] (describing how an 
Internal Affairs investigation concluded that the officer did not violate any departmental policy 
by having the tattoo). 
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disciplinary appeals will put officers at risk of being unfairly fired or 
disciplined, particularly in communities with bias against police officers.283 
No doubt, police officers deserve adequate procedure protections during 
internal disciplinary investigations. But none of the recommendations in this 
Article would strip police of their due process right to appeal disciplinary 
action. Instead, they would merely alter the current procedures used in some 
police departments to ensure a heightened level of democratic engagement 
and accountability in this process. Officers would retain the ability to 
challenge arbitrary and capricious punishments and incorrect applications of 
internal regulations. They would also still have the opportunity to bring such 
appeals before a different oversight body than that which levied the original 
disciplinary decision, ensuring that no officer could face severe punishment 
without multiple layers of oversight. And a number of police departments 
across the country already employ many of the recommendations in this 
Article. At a minimum, this demonstrates that these procedures represent a 
feasible path forward. 
CONCLUSION 
Few stories better illustrate the importance of police disciplinary appeals 
than that of an officer in Florida. An investigation by the Miami Herald found 
that, over his nineteen year career, a single sergeant faced misconduct 
accusations for allegedly “cracking the head of a handcuffed suspect, beating 
juveniles, hiding drugs in his police car, stealing from suspects, defying direct 
orders and lying and falsifying police reports.”284 At one point, he allegedly 
called in sick to take a vacation to Cancún.285 He engaged in a series of police 
chases that violated departmental policy, killing four civilians in the 
process.286 He has been arrested and jailed multiple times.287 And his 
employer has attempted to suspend and fire him more than any other officer 
in the state.288 Despite all of this, each attempt to fire the sergeant has failed, 
thanks in part to the disciplinary appeals process. 
 
283 See generally HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW 
ATTACK ON LAW AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016) (claiming, 
controversially, that the current antipolice political environment causes police to reduce 
aggressiveness, resulting in effects on crime rates). 
284 Julie K. Brown, The South Florida Cop Who Won’t Stay Fired, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1940924.html [https://perma.cc/6M6J-TC7J]. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. (describing how he “has engaged in a rash of unauthorized police chases, including one 
in which four people were killed”). 
287 Id. 
288 Id. (explaining that the department has attempted to fire him six times). 
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All police officers, including the sergeant discussed above, deserve 
adequate procedural protections during internal disciplinary investigations. 
This should include the right to appeal disciplinary action. Nevertheless, 
these disciplinary appeals procedures should not insulate officers from basic 
accountability at the expense of the broader community. This is admittedly 
a tough balance to strike. The findings from this Article, though, suggest 
that some communities may be failing to strike a reasonable balance 
between these two competing goals. 
Many communities have established appeals procedures that may hamper 
reform efforts, contribute to officer misconduct, and limit public oversight of 
police departments. Most of the agencies discussed in this study permit 
officers to appeal disciplinary action to binding arbitration. Many agencies 
allow the police union or the aggrieved officer to have a substantial role in 
selecting the arbitrator. And agencies often give this arbitrator expansive 
review authority that offers no deference to decisions made by other 
disciplinary agents, like civilian review boards, police chiefs, or city officials. 
While each of these procedural protections may be individually defensible, 
they may combine to create a formidable barrier to officer accountability. 
Police departments need not eliminate all of these appellate protections. 
But curtailing some of them, or transferring additional deference and authority 
to democratically accountable accounts, could represent an incremental step in 
ensuring that police officers are accountable to the communities they serve. 
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APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION 
In the methodology portion of this Article, I outlined how I “conducted a 
preliminary examination of the dataset and surveyed the existing literature 
discussed in Part II to identify recurring procedural elements of the 
disciplinary appeals process that may reduce democratic accountability or 
insulate officers from accountability.”289 For the purposes of brevity and 
readability, I provided only a brief discussion of how I defined the variables 
used in this study. In this Methodological Discussion, I will elaborate on the 
identification and definition of variables. 
First, I included a variable to identify when departments offered 
arbitration for officers appealing disciplinary action. This posed two 
methodological challenges. Some union contracts permit arbitration for 
some, but not all, disciplinary appeals. Others permit the use of hearing 
officers or other third parties that are the functional equivalent of arbitrators. 
Given that a large number of researchers have argued that may serve as a 
barrier to officer accountability, I defined this variable broadly so as to include 
any time contract that permits an officer to appeal any disciplinary action to 
an arbitrator, or a comparable third-party. 
Second, I included a variable that examined the selection method for 
arbitrators. The variable definition used in this study looks specifically at 
whether the contract provides the police union or police officer with 
significant authority to select the identity of the arbitrator or third party that 
will hear the appeal. In his prior work in this area, Professor Iris noted: 
The selection of who will serve as an arbitrator depends upon the willingness 
of both parties to a dispute (or in this study, series of disputes) to accept that 
individual as an arbitrator. Those arbitrators whom labor perceives as 
strongly pro-management, or vice versa, will over time find themselves not 
being selected to serve as arbitrators.290 
In Chicago and Houston, Iris found that arbitrators frequently split the 
difference between union and management demands during disciplinary 
appeals, despite the fact that the two cities used somewhat different selection 
procedures. Houston used an alternative strike system that permitted both 
labor and management to strike potential arbitrators from a panel, while 
Chicago used a panel of arbitrators stipulated in their union contract that 
 
289 See supra Part III. 
290 Iris, supra note 103, at 240. 
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gave them “quasi-permanent status.”291 Iris ultimately found that both 
selection processes were associated with similar rates of arbitrators 
overturning disciplinary decisions.292 Thus, I included in my definition of this 
variable any selection methodology that allowed officers to have a role in 
selecting an arbitrator that was equal to or greater than management. This 
would include the methodologies employed by both Houston and Chicago 
from Iris’s prior studies. I did not, however, include in this definition union 
contract provisions that defer to the selection process recommended by 
national associations or arbitrators or mediators—even if those associations 
recommend a similar approach. It is important to explicitly clarify that this 
Article does not take the position that these selection methodologies are, in 
and of themselves, problematic. Rather, it makes a narrower argument, 
similar to that made by other previous researchers like Professor Iris, that this 
sort of a selection methodology may theoretically create unintended 
incentives to compromise on disciplinary action because police disciplinary 
arbitrators are repeat players—particularly when this variable is present with 
other variables considered in this study. 
Third, I included a variable to determine whether a police union contract 
made arbitration decisions binding on the municipality. I coded an arbitration 
procedure as binding if the contract explicitly said as much, or if it was the 
final step of an appellate procedure, even if some states may permit limited 
judicial review of arbitrator’s decisions. But such situations are relatively rare. 
Most states make arbitration decisions binding and limit judicial review of 
arbitration decisions.293 The Supreme Court has also held that the “refusal of 
courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is . . . proper,”294 meaning 
that an arbitrator “can be wrong on the facts and wrong on the law and a court 
will not overturn the arbitrator’s opinion.”295 
Finally, I included a variable to determine the standard of review used 
by arbitrators on appeal. The vast majority of contracts simply articulated 
the acceptable conditions under which a police department could discipline 
an officer (often for “just cause,” “legitimate cause,” or “good cause”). Most 
contracts then gave an arbitrator expansive authority to determine whether 
a police chief, city manager, or civilian review board had such sufficient 
cause to punish an officer, and to decide whether the punishment was 
proportional to the alleged offense. I attempted to be as judicious as 
possible in coding contracts under this variable. If a union contract placed 
 
291 Iris, Police Discipline in Houston, supra note 103, at 146. 
292 Id. at 146-47. 
293 Stoughton, supra note 58, at 2210. 
294 Id. (quoting Steelworks v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).  
295 Id. (quoting WILL AITCHISON, THE RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 98 (6th 
ed. 2009)). 
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any limit on an arbitrator’s authority to re-review factual or legal findings 
handed down earlier in the disciplinary proceeding, I coded that contract as 
not falling into this category. Thus, I tried to only capture in this definition 
those contracts that provide arbitrators with something akin to de novo 
review authority of disciplinary decisions. 
